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ABSTRACT
Research was conducted on the proposed Green Line Extension, a light rail corridor from
Cambridge through Somerville and Medford, Massachusetts. The project is being undertaken by
the Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority. Due to legal commitments and agreements, the line must be in revenue service by
December 31, 2014, or the state faces penalties.
Interviews, literature review and personal experience come together to explore the process
behind completing such a large, complex infrastructure project. It is theorized, and confirmed,
that a strong articulated and utilized policy statement will help the state complete this project
with greater speed and efficiency. In order to confirm this hypothesis, each problem facing the
project process is broken down and examined for the ability to improve the project process.
Findings include the need for greater accountability, organizational reform and regulation
overhaul. The research is applicable not only to the current work on the Green Line Extension,
but to similar infrastructure projects state- and nation-wide. Finally, the thesis proposes that trust
in planners has failed in a variety of ways. This lack of trust manifests itself in poor projects and
a poor process. Generating a greater level of trust in planners and the planning process will
create significant improvements to future endeavors.
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Chapter I: Introduction
On October 27, 2004 the Boston Red Sox won their first baseball championship in
eighty-six years by beating the St. Louis Cardinals in St. Louis. Yet, on that very same night,
over 300 concerned citizens from Somerville, Medford, Cambridge and surrounding
Massachusetts towns came out to meet in Somerville High School's auditorium for a public
meeting. The auditorium, at over seventy-five years old, is a dark, dreary room with poor sound
amplification, creaky seats, and certainly no televisions. But that night, hundreds of people were
dragged away from their living room sets and local bars to witness an act that was almost as long
in the making as the Red Sox' victory.
The Green Line Extension was finally coming to these long-deprived inner suburbs, or so
the meeting's attendees thought. The event was a public meeting for the "Beyond Lechmere"
project, a study of alternatives commissioned by the MBTA to decide which strategies were best
for bringing rapid transit to the hillsides of Somerville and Medford. The project had first been
proposed in the 1940s, and while the residents were patient, more than half a century was too
long to wait. Somerville and Medford were once crawling with streetcar lines connecting the
neighborhoods to each other and downtown Boston. Now, only one rail line runs through the
affected area, and it doesn't stop for passengers. Massachusetts had made the commitment to
build a new light rail line in 1990, but the promise didn't seem to be holding any water. Despite
this, 300 people showed up for a meeting on the same night as Game 4 of the 2004 World Series.
And that is because there was finally hope. With this new study by the MBTA, the state
at long last looked serious about improving transit, air quality and general quality of life in the
area. Regan Checchio, a public affairs manager, and Kristine Wickham, a project manager,
remember the meeting well. They reminisce about the "supportive atmosphere" that was that
night. Everyone who spoke was in favor of the Green Line Extension in one way or another.
Advocates Ken Krause and Ellin Resiner sat in the audience and spoke about the improved
future of their hometowns when a new transportation choice helped get cars off the roads. The
meeting and the study were both deemed a success by all involved.
On March 11, 2009, with one of the world's most famous bands, U2, playing half a mile
away at the Somerville Theater, about 400 citizens packed the same auditorium once more.
Almost four and half years later, in that same auditorium, the optimism was significantly
diminished. Regan, Kristine, Ken and Ellin are all back, having been working on this project in
the meantime, but this time, they were faced with an angry constituency. Kate Fichter, a
transportation planner for the Executive Office of Transportation, lead the meeting, giving a
presentation emphasizing how early in the process the project still is. The irritated public
pummeled Kate with questions about when the project will be completed, the design of certain
aspects, and whether a support facility will be built next to a residential building.
The mood of the meeting is clear: despite the desire to have such an improvement in their
cities, almost everybody is concerned with the impact it will have. In four years plenty of work
has been done, but not nearly enough for Kate to fully answer every question the public throws at
her. She is frustrated, wondering what could be done differently. How, in four short years, has
this project gone from being universally accepted and desired, to a feeling of wariness and lack
of faith? And how, in four years, has seemingly so little progress been made?
This thesis tackles the questions raised by experience working on the Green Line
Extension project. A project that was once so wanted by communities and residents is now on
the verge of being delayed further. What has happened? Is it indicative of all transportation
projects? And if so, what can be done about it?
Purpose
Studying the Green Line Extension has a much deeper purpose than just finding the flaws
in the current process. It is no secret that infrastructure projects in Massachusetts and around the
world are complex and difficult to complete. Society has created professional planners in order
to improve this process, but many planners are unable to properly do their jobs due to a variety
of forces. It seems that understanding and removing these forces would allow for better planners
and better planning, which is what this research hopes to accomplish.
Of course, there are those in the public who will never believe the word of planners, or
the intentions of those who seek to change the world around them. The purpose here is to see
what can be accomplished along with converting those non-believers. How can processes be
improved? Is a project that is run smoothly and efficiently, better? Answering these questions
would do a great deal for both the planning community and the public at large.
Personally, this project holds a special significance. As an intern at EOT, the project was
the primary goal of the office, but also served as the biggest source of frustration. One additional
purpose for this analysis is to help close up that personal connection with the project and help
those who are still currently working on it.
The final goal and purpose of this research is to help those who feel trapped by the
machine of bureaucracy. Professional planners often feel as if they are restricted when it comes
to planning, and they are confined by their elected bosses, public opinion or restrictive
regulation. The public often (rightfully) feels as if decisions that are vitally important to them are
made without their input. Removing some obstacles could go a long way to bettering the
profession, making projects simpler, and enhancing the relationship between people and
government. The desire here is to investigate the reasons behind ineffective processes, and see if
there are potential improvements to be made to the general project process.
Research Question and Hypothesis
In order to meet these goals and purpose, this research must have a common research
question and hypothesis to test. Such a question has been developed by whittling down from
larger, more broadly reaching possibilities down to a detailed question. This research question
begins as a look at how the process of decision making on large scale infrastructure projects has
an impact on their progress and completion. Such a question takes the form:
How does the process by which a project is undertaken have an effect on the
outcome ofsuch a project?
However, this question is obviously unwieldy and difficult to grasp in its current form, so it must
be broken down further in the direction of this research. By focusing on the Green Line
Extension, we can get a question that is simpler and much more manageable to conduct research
with. That question takes the form:
How can the process of completing the Green Line Extension project become
more efficient and effective?
This question is much more straightforward, but answering it will allow for us to postulate on
answers to the broader question above. By framing the Green Line Extension as a case study, we
can chew upon the answers for this project in order to address the question for similar projects.
Of course, in order to conduct the right research to answer these questions, we must have
a theory to test. This theory will be tested by using a case study method, as described in the
Methodology chapter. The articulation of this proposition came about through literature review
and interviews on the subject. One of the major themes from the interviews and literature is the
two kinds of participants when it comes to a major project: those who trust the group attempting
to execute the project, and those who do not. This means that there are many people who will
refuse to believe what the transportation agency, government, private contractor or any person in
a position of authority says or attempts to prove. And that the only time to sway these people is
before the project even gets under way, by earning their trust.
The theory then is what this thesis proposes in order to change minds, and in turn make
the Green Line Extension project more efficient and effective:
The state needs to use a more clearly articulated set ofpolicies regarding major
infrastructure projects, stating what types ofprojects will be advanced, funded,
and who will be accountable for implementation. Such a policy would be a shift
from the current format of supporting projects individually. By failing to
successfully articulate these policies to the public, the state adds to the problems
of 'impossibility theorem', 'unreturned cafeteria trays' and the justificationist
model'. By clearly defining the policy positions of the state, projects will become
more efficient and regulations can be relaxed.
This means that without asserting and employing such a publically articulated policy, the state
invites three issues upon itself. The 'impossibility theorem' states that there is no process that
can guarantee a socially optimum choice for any problem in the public realm, as all people have
differing preferable solutions. This prevents consensus building in the public eye. 'Unreturned
cafeteria trays' refers to the issue that there are many possible perspectives with very different
diagnoses. Again, this prevents consensus building and public support for one alternative.
Finally, the 'justificationist model' focuses solely on maximizing economic utility, which is
difficult with such a far-reaching project. Utility maximization often prevents planners from
using their training to make the best possible decisions. By having and utilizing an articulated
policy, the theory of this thesis is that there three issues can be mitigated, and thus efficiency and
effectiveness can be improved on the Green Line Extension, and other major infrastructure
projects.
Summary of Chapters
This chapter has outlined the background and purpose of the thesis, while giving a brief
introduction to the Green Line Extension. It has outlined the research question and theory to be
tested and touched upon the methodology to be used. That methodology will be discussed at
length in Chapter III and the entire process of this research will be outlined. Between here and
there, Chapter II provides a background on the Green Line Extension, as well as Massachusetts'
transportation planning history. It also includes a glossary of terms and acronyms that will be
helpful in dissecting the alphabet soup of this thesis.
Chapter IV begins the literature review process. Here we will look at environmental law
and historical record, a slew of social choice questions, and transportation - land use
interactions. Chapter V then provides the connection between much of the literature and
transportation planning, explaining why the problems of social choice are important to planners,
and how it is all connected. This connections chapter will bring the Green Line Extension back
together with the literature. Following that, Chapter VI provides discussion of the conducted
interviews. This discussion touches on the overarching themes weaned from the interview
process, and how they meld with the theory posed.
The penultimate chapter brings everything together. Here, in Chapter VII: Findings and
Recommendations, we evaluate the hypothesis and answer the research questions by bringing
together all the loose ends from Chapters IV, V and VI. This chapter also poses a series of
recommendations based on the analysis that aim to improve the process both for the Green Line
Extension and other infrastructure projects. Finally, Chapter VIII summarizes the work once
more, for those who chose to skip to the end.
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Chapter II: History and Glossary
The history of the Green Line Extension plays a very important role in the decisions that
are made in the present. Each of the planners, politicians, consultants and advocates working and
influencing the project today have a different personal history that colors their perception of the
decision making process. The concept of the extension has been around for almost a half century
and survived major political and ideological shifts throughout those decades. The history has also
been framed by two major federal agencies, The Environmental Protection Agency and the
Federal Transit Authority, as well as many new regulations on infrastructure passed since World
War II. This chapter aims to examine the history of the Green Line Extension in order to provide
appropriate context for the decisions being made on the project today.
Environmental Law
The Green Line Extension is a project with minimal environmental impact; it runs
through an area with existing rail use, it crosses no wetlands, and it interrupts no wildlife
preserves. But the history of the extension is invariably tied to the environmental process. For
almost two centuries, the United States had barely any environmental law. It wasn't until the
1960s that the phrase 'environmental law' even came into use in this country (Lazarus 2004).
With the establishment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970, that all
changed dramatically. The cultural change that accompanied NEPA has changed federal
agencies across the board and NEPA's expectations permeate the decision making structures of
all infrastructure projects (Clark and Canter 1997). Before 1970, the major environmental law
was the Clean Air Act, established in 1955. Unfortunately, the Clean Air Act was, at the time, a
mostly toothless regulation that was hampered by a lack of authority in controlling air quality
standards (Lazarus 2004). With the passage of NEPA in 1970, that all changed.
With amendments or parallel laws, the Clean Air Act went through a dramatic shift from
1970 to 1990 (Machala 2007). One result of these amendments was to bring the process of
transportation planning closer to that of environmental protection. The new Clean Air Act
charged the EPA with setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards for air pollutants.
Limiting pollutants was seen as necessary for public safety. The regulations have been changed
multiple times since 1990, but Boston has remained in "non-attainment" for pollutants (Machala
2007). In order to combat this, the EPA required that each state complete a State Implementation
Plan (SIP) in order to outline the actions being undertaken to comply with the law. As described
below, the establishment of the SIP has had a dramatic influence on planning at the state level.
The establishment of NEPA has also had a more direct impact on infrastructure planning.
Within these regulations is described a permitting program that insists that the EPA (or local
environmental agency) be allowed to review any and all projects undertaken (Clark and Canter
Figure 3: Flow chart of environmental permitting process. Source: Moore, pg 9.
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1997). The EPA reviews projects before they begin, and establishes the level of environmental
review that must be undertaken by the project sponsor (as shown in Figure 3): Categorical
Exclusion (CX) indicates no review necessary; Environmental Assessment (EA) is a small
document; and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a detailed report of all possible impacts
(Moore 1997). The EPA regulation describes what must be in each type of report, and each
review is finalized with a notice of decision, either permitting the project to move forward, or
halting and changing the project. This permitting system is a major shift in the planning process
of previous years, and adds both complexity and time to the planning process.
Transit History
Somerville and Medford have long been served by mass transit oriented towards Boston.
In the 1850s, the first streetcar lines of the area ran from Union Square to Harvard Square in
Cambridge. Over the next 50 years, numerous streetcar lines were established, crisscrossing
Somerville and Medford. They provided transit to and from Boston, Cambridge and other
communities. The two towns were soon seen as commuter towns, where people could live and
still get to jobs and services in the city (Binford 1985). In the 1940s, a trackless trolley ran the
route from Clarendon Hill down to Lechmere over 100 times daily. Heavy railways started
coming into the area as well, with the New Hampshire Mainline (now the Lowell Line) and
Fitchburg Line providing faster rail service to far away towns and cities (Vanasse Hangen
Brustlin 2005). Trolleys and streetcars began to be reduced in the 1950s with the popularization
of automobiles, further reducing transit options. With the introduction of the Orange Line to the
east, and Red Line to the west, it was clear by the middle of the 2 0 th century that Somerville and
Medford were being passed over by transit.
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Figure 4: Somerville's transit and economic activity, 1860. The current Lowell Line runs through the center of the map,
labeled as the "Boston & Lowell" line. Source: Binford, pg 158.
This fact was certainly noticed by planners at the time, who set out to rectify the problem.
The "North Terminal Area Study" of 1962 aimed to branch the Green Line along the railroad
right of way. The 1973 "Boston Transportation Review" noted that the Somerville corridor was
an area that needed serious considerations of improved service. In 1981, the MBTA itself
conducted a study ("Green Line Northwest Project Study") which assessed options for moving
trains past Lechmere (Vanasse Hangen Brustlin 2005). The idea of extending the Green Line is
not a new one, which only serves to complicate the process.
The Big Dig
The Central Artery / Tunnel Project (CA/T), colloquially known as the "Big Dig" is the
biggest infrastructure project in the history of Massachusetts, and by some measures in the
world. In the 1950s, as the national interstate highway system was being developed, an elevated
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highway through the downtown and waterfront of Boston was proposed by Commissioner of
Public Works William Callahan. What resulted was a blight on the city, stretching from the
Dewey Square Tunnel under South Station north to the Charles River (Machala 2007).
Beginning in the 1970s, Secretary of Transportation Frederick Salvucci, along with a long line of
advocates, began to argue for tearing down the structure and replacing it with a tunnel. This
would serve to increase capacity on the roadway, reduce the high level of emissions from the
roadway, and reconnect the city (Machala 2007). This process was mired and affected by an
endless list of actors, regulations, lawsuits, regime changes and design decisions, as it did not
begin construction until the early 1990s.' Due to the regulations discussed above, the CA/T
project was required to submit to an environmental review process in 1990. This process showed
that the entire project would help to reduce emissions within the city, but many in the community
were not convinced (Luberoff and Altshuler 1996). The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a
national environmental advocacy organization, seized this opportunity to push for a commitment
from the state to reduce emissions through a series of mitigations, including transit projects
(Luberoff and Altshuler 1996).
This commitment became known as the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
and was signed by Salvucci and CLF Director Douglas Foy. This document, for all intents and
purposes, was now the guiding light for transit improvements in Massachusetts. The MOU
included 14 transit-related projects, including the Green Line Extension, but only to "Ball
Square/Tufts University" (MOU1990). Those 14 projects include three bus projects, six
commuter rail projects and five rapid transit projects. How these 14 projects were settled on is a
bit of a mystery. Almost all the projects have a deep history in Massachusetts and were talked
1 For an excellent detailed account of CA/T's history and decision making, please refer to Mega-Project by David
Luberoff and Alan Altshuler. It uses interviews, historical record and personal experience to recount the CA/T
project from its beginnings all the way through 1996.
about before and during the CA/T Project. But in reaching the agreement, none of the projects
were subject to a scoping session or basic need assessment, meaning that it was possible that
Salvucci was signing a document requiring the Commonwealth to complete a project that was
not viable. One such example is the Arborway restoration. Having closed the streetcar line south
of Heath Street in 1985, the MOU called for its restoration by 1996 (MOU 1990). This project
has been since abandoned, partially due to lack of public desire for the project, and lack of
increased benefits for reopening the line - despite the original legal commitment.
But Salvucci had little time to think about signing the MOU. That year, 1990, was a
major turning point for the CA/T Project, politically. Governor Mike Dukakis, an avid rail
supporter, was voted out of office, and it was highly likely that Salvucci would be replaced by
incoming Governor William Weld. Foy, Salvucci and Dukakis were concerned about the staying
power of transit commitments once the group left office, and so rushed to finish the MOU as the
fall of 1990 came to a close. In January 1991, the agreement was signed, just two weeks before
the end of Dukakis' administration (Luberoff and Altshuler 1996).2 This allowed both sides to
avoid a costly lawsuit, as well as to create a document that would be more easily amendable if
the need arose. CLF claimed at the time that the MOU represented exactly what result would
have occurred if they had brought a lawsuit against the state under the Clean Air Act (Luberoff
and Altshuler 1996).
Also in 1990, the Clean Air Act was amended as discussed above. This amendment put
the entire Commonwealth of Massachusetts into a state of non-attainment in terms of air quality.
This helped to provide the political cover for CLF and Salvucci to push for the transit
2 One side effect of all of the political wrangling on the Big Dig was the choice of "Scheme Z" for crossing the
Charles River. This plan allowed for a large swath of land in Cambridge, known as "NorthPoint", to be developed.
The city and state rushed permits for this project as part of mitigation, a choice that would haunt the planners of the
Green Line Extension almost two decades later.
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Figure 5: The commonly seen map of the entire Central Artery / Tunnel project. Source: MassPort
improvements. These improvements would form the basis of Massachusetts' attempts to gain air
quality compliance (Luberoff and Altshuler 1996). This Clean Air Act amendment also required
each state to form a State Implementation Plan (SIP) which would serve as the document
explaining how that compliance would be reached. The EPA reviews the SIP of each state to
ensure that compliance will be reached, and usually, projects are added to the SIP by a complex
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process involving the state's regional planning organizations, known as MPOs (Machala 2007).
However, despite the existence of the SIP, the fourteen projects were not placed on it and, as
Weld entered office, any progress on the MOU ground quickly to a halt.
Weld, and the Republican regime that took over with him, found one obvious fault with
the agreement signed by Salvucci and Dukakis: where was all the money going to come from?
Weld understood that the MOU outlined important projects for the state to undertake, but at the
same time, the MOU called for a freeze in MBTA fares (except to rise with inflation). Backed by
the MBTA Advisory Board and the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Weld began to
wonder where the money was supposed to come from if there was to be no means of increased
farebox recovery. The executive director of the MBTA Advisory Board, Anne Lamerm was
quoted as saying that the MOU was "irresponsible" (Luberoff and Altshuler 1996). Salvucci
countered that the architectural plans were already there, and Foy threatened to sue. For the
remainder of 1991, no action was taken on any of the commitments made in the MOU.
Doug Foy followed through on his promise, bringing a suit from CLF against the state in
late 1991. Negotiations began quickly, as each side wanted to avoid a costly legal fight. Weld's
administration decided to add all fourteen of the original commitments to the newly-created SIP,
which meant that responsibility for making sure they were completed would fall to the state and
federal EPA (Luberoff and Altshuler 1996). This allowed Foy to back off and settle his lawsuit,
because from March 1992 forward, these fourteen projects were committed to legally, with
severe penalties for a lack of compliance. While a major step had been taken, and victory
declared by CLF, Foy and CLF had to still be vigilant that the state would complete the projects.
Stagnation on the SIP
Despite the victory by CLF of getting the projects on the SIP, the Green Line Extension
stagnated during the rest of the 1990s. The regulation written into 310 CMR 7.36 was precise,
but largely ignored (SIP Amendment 2006). During these years, the Commonwealth was mostly
focused on completing the CA/T, which was coming in billions of dollars over budget, and years
behind schedule. The MBTA and EOT began work on some of the projects of the SIP, and were
able to complete a few, but none of these were urban projects. The suburban projects were easier
to complete due to fewer competing constituencies and more space, but most also served fewer
people (CLF 2006). The MBTA and EOT also did not have the capacity at the time to undertake
such a large slate of projects at once. They simply prioritized and began working on those that
could be done by the deadlines, and those that didn't require a large alternatives analysis. At the
time, the Green Line Extension was still described as a "Green Line extension and improvement"
to Somerville and Tufts (2006). This description meant that planners had a daunting task -
exactly what constituted an improvement, and where exactly should it go? Somerville has a large
number of former and current rail lines, so deciding the path to take was not trivial.
In the meantime, however, CLF served the state with a "Notice of Intent" to sue based on
the projects that were behind schedule or on no schedule at all (CLF 2006). The original SIP had
the Green Line Extension completed by 2010, a date that was looking less and less likely (MOU
1990). This time, the state had no answer or negotiation for CLF, and the suit went forward in
state court in 1999. The following year, the state Attorney General, Scott Harshbarger, filed a
federal lawsuit against a slew of state agencies for the same lack of advancement alleged by
CLF. In order to settle the lawsuits, the state entered into an agreement with CLF and the
Attorney General, in what is now known as the Administrative Consent Order (ACO) of 2000
(CLF 2006). The ACO amends the SIP by giving new deadlines for all the unfinished projects, as
well as adding new projects to make up for the delays. The ACO is wide-reaching, and begins to
give better guidance on the scope of most projects (ACO 2000). The Green Line Extension was
given a new deadline of 2011, but no further guidance on the project was added. During the next
four years, major strides were made on completing the projects in the ACO, including the
completion of the Greenbush Commuter Rail Line and a new MBTA bus fleet, but no action was
taken on the Green Line Extension until 2004.
The Final SIP Substitution
By 2004, while the "Beyond Lechmere" process was ongoing (discussed below), CLF
again served a "Notice of Intent" to sue the state. This time, they were joined by the cities of
Somerville and Medford. At this point, the original SIP was down to only three major
commitments: the Arborway restoration on the E-Branch, Red-Blue Connector and the Green
Line Extension. In order to settle this time, CLF wanted a 10% increase in benefits from these
three projects. Despite some wrangling over exactly what this meant, an agreement was made in
principle to again amend the SIP through another Administrative Consent Order (Machala 2007).
This amendment gave the SIP legislation much more definition than ever before by outlining the
process by which one project could be substituted for another, and the penalties that would incur
from such an action, or a lack of compliance (Machala 2007). With this amendment, and a
subsequent one, the state was able to dismiss of the Arborway commitment, complete other
projects in the pipeline and reduce the burden on the Red-Blue Connector. Today, the state is
required to study the Red-Blue connector and complete design; add parking spaces; complete the
Fairmont project and finish the Green Line Extension by 2014. Furthermore, the SIP Substitution
added distance to the original Green Line Extension proposals by requiring service to Medford
Hillside and Union Square, as well as adding a requirement for public outreach on the project
(SIP Amendment 2006). Officials at EOT are now convinced they can complete these
requirements by the defined dates.
The "Beyond Lechmere" Study
The first step in getting the Green Line Extension built was the undertaking of the
"Beyond Lechmere" study by the MBTA. Led by MBTA Director of Planning, Joe Cosgrove,
the MBTA selected a team of consultants led by Vanasse Hangen Brustlin to undertake a Major
Investment Study / Alternatives Analysis (MIS/AA). The purpose of this undertaking was to
determine which alternatives to consider going forward for the project. This level of definition
had been left ambiguous in the SIP, and so this step of evaluating the alternatives was necessary.
The consultant team worked with the MBTA and a large public advisory group to determine
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Figure 6: Station sites as first proposed in the Beyond Lechmere Study. Source: EOT
which options were feasible from the perspective of engineering, operations, cost and impact
(Vanasse Hangen Brustlin 2005). The planning process was intended to be open and honest, and
solicit opinions from the public while diving deeper into the issue than any study before. The
study itself took almost two years to finish and included numerous community and advisory
group meetings.
At the end of the "Beyond Lechmere" study, the MBTA was left with a series of options
for continuing on with the process. These included options for extension of light rail, bus rapid
transit, commuter rail and no build (Vanasse Hangen Brustlin 2005). Unfortunately, in the
summer of 2005, the MBTA lacked the staff and funding to take the project to the next step. It
was at this time that the Green Line Extension's responsibilities were transferred over to the
Executive Office of Transportation for further work. Proponents of the project refer to this time
as 'the hiccup', as it took a little bit of extra time to get the project moving while EOT was also
working on the SIP substitution as described above.
The Environmental Process, Again
In order to get the project moving again, EOT submitted an Expanded Environmental
Notification Form (EENF) to the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) in October
2006.3 This document is used to help EOEA determine what level of environmental review is
necessary for the project in order to gain environmental permits. The EENF submission was
accompanied by a series of scoping sessions held by EOEA to help gauge the level of public
interest and hear concerns on the current scope as outlined by the "Beyond Lechmere" MIS/AA
(Woelfel 2006). From these meetings and the EENF, Secretary Robert Golledge Jr. issued what
is known as the "Secretary's Certificate" which outlines the opinions of EOEA on the project.
3 EOEA is the Massachusetts state-level agency analogous to the federal EPA.
28
LWE
- :AI~i::~~P iii::j:::!iD I.I~i:ii 4. i:!:?
Massachusetts Atemrnative 1C Conceptual Alignment
Bay
Transportation
Authority
Figure 7: Alternative IC of the Beyond Lechmere Study. Source: EOT
The certificate also gives the scope and definition to the project that had been lacking for a
decade and a half. It outlines the best options presented by EOT and discusses the matters EOT
needs to consider when preparing the documents for final environmental review, which in this
case is an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) (Robert W. Golledge 2006).
The Certificate tells EOT that it needs to consider a few major alignment options:
whether to extend to Mystic Valley Parkway and how to align the Union Square spur. The
Certificate goes on to enumerate suggested stops to consider, issues of air quality, ridership,
traffic and mitigation, along with many others (Robert W. Golledge 2006). This document, upon
its issuing in December of 2006 became the guiding document for the Green Line Extension, and
has shaped all decisions made since that date.
Lechmere Northwest Corridor Study
The Current Phase
Upon receiving the Secretary's Certificate, EOT began to undertake the process of EIR
preparation, which was expected to take 18 months. EOT hired a consultant team, again led by
Vanasse Hangen Brustlin, to undertake the preparation of the EIR, due in the Fall of 2008. EOT
also began public outreach, forming an advisory group similar to the one used in the "Beyond
Lechmere" study. Since the first advisory group meeting in October of 2007, EOT has held a
variety of public meetings, private meetings with stakeholders and internal discussions in order
to advance the project through preliminary engineering. Station sites have been identified,
corridor constraints discussed, and decisions on alignment reached. During this time, EOT has
also decided to apply for funding from the Federal Transit Authority through a program called
"New Starts". This program provides funding for major transit projects across the country, but
the process for receiving funds is long and complicated. New Starts bases its evaluation on a
cost/benefit analysis, which often puts it at odds with the environmental review process. Getting
federal funding is hence a large hurdle to overcome for the state. The overall progress of the
Green Line Extension has thus been slow, difficult and stressful, as will be discussed in further
chapters.
At the time of this writing, EOT and its consultant team are a few months behind
schedule, and are looking to release the Draft EIR in Spring 2009. The Secretary of EOEA will
review the EIR and hold a comment period for letters and public meetings, in order for the
public's opinion to be heard. Following that, a ruling will be made whether to accept the EIR, or
request changes. If accepted (i.e., the Draft EIR serves as a Final EIR), the project will move
forward into design, with construction slated to begin in fall 2011. If rejected, EOT will need to
revaluate the project, and the 2014 deadline will be in jeopardy.
Planning Choices
As this thesis deals extensively with issues of trust and respect, it is useful to understand
the choices that planners are faced with on the Green Line Extension on a day-to-day basis.
Many of the choices are simple ones that have already been decided, and many are more
complex issues that will be references throughout the thesis. This listing is intended to enumerate
only some of these choices in order to give the reader who may be unfamiliar with the project a
better understanding of some of the issues facing planners.
* What mode best serves the corridor in question? (Light rail is the current proposed mode)
* What specific locations should the line serve? Where should stops be located? (see
following map)
* Should the Extension remain on current rail paths, or use tunnels or surface running to
reach different areas?
* Where should the Extension stop? Medford Hillside or Mystic Valley Parkway?
* What form should stations take?
* Should there be a maintenance facility for the increased number of vehicles on the line?
Where should such a facility be located? How should such a facility be mitigated?
* What mitigation methods should be taken along the entire line to protect the environment,
limit noise, and keep people safe?
* How should economic development be considered in the development and location of
station sites? How should it be considered in the building of a maintenance facility?
* How should the land use plans of the communities be considered at station locations?
What about for the maintenance facility? What land should be considered 'off limits' to a
maintenance facility?
* Should a community path e constructed along with the rail line?
* How much weight should be put into the 2014 deadline? Should it be changed?
* How will other infrastructure projects interact with the Green Line Extension? Should
there be greater connections to the existing rail lines?
* What role should different advocates have in the planning process?
* Who makes the final decisions on the above stated choices?
Timeline of Green Line Extension
1990-2009
1990 Central Artery Tunnel Project begins Environmental review
1991 January Memorandum of Understanding between EOT and CLF signed
1991 January Governor Dukakis' term ends
1992 larch Projects on MOU transferred to SIP
1992 - 2000 No action on Green Line Extension
2000 ACO extends Green Line Extension deadline by one year
2004- 2005 Beyond Lechmere Study conducted
2004 - 2007 Various SIP amendments add definition and deadline to GLE
2006 Octo6er EENF submitted
2006 (Decem6er Secretary's Certificate issued
2007 October First Advisory Group meeting
2009 EIR submitted to EOEA
2010 Original mandated completion date
2011 Second mandated completion date
2011 Construction currently slated to begin
2014 Current mandated and planned completion date
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Glossary
ACO - Administrative Consent Order, generally a binding legal agreement between a
government agency and another party, in this case refers to 2000 agreement to push back the
deadline of Green Line Extension by one year, while making more significant changes to other
projects
Arborway - The "E" Branch of the Green Line, which extended to Forest Hills (parallel to the
Arborway roadway) until 1985, when it was "temporarily" scaled back to Heath Street, has since
been removed from consideration as a project
CA/T - The Central Artery /Third Harbor Tunnel Project - Boston's Big Dig - a decades long
odyssey to place the unsightly Central Artery railed highway in a tunnel, create a new harbor
tunnel to East Boston; and other smaller improvements; eventually was finished over time and
over budget
CLF - The Conservation Law Foundation, an environmentally-minded non-profit with
considerable legal strength who first sued the state in order to speed up progress on
transportation projects around the Commonwealth
EENF - Extended Environmental Notification Form - submitted to the state and federal EPA,
this form outlines the possible scope of a major project, and the EPA responds to the form with
the Secretary's Certificate
EIR - Environmental Impact Report - a major report submitted to the EPA on each
infrastructure project in order to get the appropriate environmental permits
EOEA - the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs is the agency that
handles environmental permitting in the Commonwealth
EOT - the Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation is the agency responsible for all
major infrastructure projects in Massachusetts, also known by EOTC and EOTPW
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency or Environmental Policy Act
MBTA - Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the primary provider of public transit in
Massachusetts
MIS/AA - Major Investment Study / Alternatives Analysis - basically, just what it sounds like, a
study that determines the best set of alternatives to consider for a major investment
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding, referring to the 1990 agreement between EOT and
CLF to do a series of public transit projects as mitigation for the Big Dig
Red-Blue Connector - a project that would connect Boston's Bowdoin Station (on the Blue
Line) with Charles/MGH Station (on the Red Line) underneath Cambridge Street, currently
beginning design
Secretary's Certificate - a letter from the Secretary of EOEA giving the go ahead to begin
planning for a project, helps to outline the scope of the project, done before the environmental
review process begins, but after scoping has finished
SIP - after 1990, every state must have a State Implementation Plan to address how it will meet
air quality standards in the Clean Air Act; the SIP in Massachusetts is mostly comprised of
transit projects first agreed to in the 1990 MOU
Vanasse Hangen Brustlin - a consulting firm, hired by EOT and tasked with preparing all of
the environmental documents for the Green Line Extension
Chapter III: Methodology
In order to uncover the answers to the questions of how to improve project efficiency,
there must be a thorough research method. This chapter discusses the steps taken on that
research, both before and after the conducting of interviews, and looks to link the research
methodology with the research questions. And most importantly, why this thesis uses the case
study method to frame the discussion.
Identify the Questions
The first step in setting up this research methodology is to identify the questions that are
to be answered. This process started months ago, with work in the Massachusetts Executive
Office of Transportation. As an intern there, working on a variety of projects, the basic lessons
learned were that everything is more complicated than you originally think it will be, projects
take longer than expected, and that efficiency is a fleeting virtue. By working specifically on the
Green Line Extension, it became obvious that it was a project that meshed well with all those
lessons, and was in dire need of some help. The first and most basic question to be asked was
"How can we make this process better?"
The prospect of "better" is difficult to quantify, and so this thesis focuses on the aspect of
efficiency. Efficient can be difficult to separate from effective and fair, as all seek a Pareto-
optimum solution of some kind. Short of quantifying that effect, we focus here on how a project
progresses with respect to time and ease of completion. An efficient project is therefore one that
progresses smoothly and quickly. While it is difficult to claim whether effectiveness and fairness
tradeoffs are worthwhile, we can examine whether delays offer much prospect for improving
other dimensions. Despite the status of the Green Line Extension's as a legally mandated project
with a hard deadline, it moves quite slowly. Improving on the efficiency of the project is a major
goal. The Green Line Extension also has much in common with many large scale infrastructure
projects, making it a good project to research, with the hopes of generalizing some findings to
many different projects. The research questions serve to focus specifically on the Green Line
Extension project while having a more broadly reaching goal to impact all types of infrastructure
projects. The theory to test for the analysis was come upon through examination of the literature,
as well as the conducted interviews, so it was actually arrived upon after much of the research
had been completed.
Using a Case Study Method
This thesis uses the Green Line Extension as a case study method as part of the
examination all major infrastructure projects in Massachusetts. Before choosing a case study
approach, the Green Line Extension's problems were examined to determine exactly what style
of analysis would be useful. Investigating those dilemmas and reading the appropriate literature,
it became clear that the problems focused around 'how' and 'why' questions, and that the aim of
the final conclusions would be to extrapolate findings on the Green Line Extension to many
different projects. These aspects line up well with the basic tenets of case study methodology, as
opposed to experimentation or surveys (Schon 1983). The Green Line Extension is also an
unique case with which the author has a great deal of familiarity, making it much simpler to
attempt a case study analysis. Further reasoning was developed from Robert Yin's excellent Case
Study Research, one of the leading texts on using case study methods.
Yin points out that case studies are often useful in the type of research being attempted in
this thesis. Case studies are practical for research purposes in social sciences and organizational
studies. Yin asserts that case studies are most valuable when answering 'how' or 'why' questions
because they require an explanatory answer that may not be provided in an experiment's data or
historical analysis. These types of questions often have ambiguous answers, the primary driver of
case study methods. Yin adds that case studies are valuable in contemporary events in which
there is little to no control over the behavior of those being studied (such as in an experiment).
Having such a situation allows for direct observation and interviews, which are usually not
included in historical studies. But the lack of control over subjects permits the events to play out
regardless of the case study's presence. 4 Yin identifies these situations as prime candidates for
case study research (Yin 1984).
Schon points out in his The Reflective Practitioner that case study methods are perfect for
situations in which generic problem solving skills are used (Schon 1983). The aim of focusing on
the Green Line Extension is to develop improvements to the generic project process that will
have impacts on future processes. Schon discusses the need for case studies in business school,
stating that one of the best ways to learn about business is from other business models. That is
exactly what is happening here, but in the planning realm.
The Green Line Extension is a perfect match for this method of analysis based on Yin
and Schon's outlines for using case studies. The questions posed are all 'how' and 'why'
questions. The events are contemporary, with the project team hoping to file an environmental
report within the same month as the finishing of this thesis. This allows for direct observation of
events as they unfold, as well as in depth interviews for the major players (see below). The
author's history with the project team and project itself also aids in these two factors. Finally,
common problem solving skills are developed for future projects.
4 By working with the project team, there is certainly the possibility of having an influence and changing behavior
on the project, but the author has made a conscious effort not to affect the results or outcomes of any project goals
by keeping information gained in interviews close to the vest until after this process is finished. The converse is also
possible: that interviewees did not always give truthful answers. The analysis must be conscious of both sides of this
issue going forward.
Yin's work goes on to discuss methods for case study data collection, analysis and
reporting, and he discusses two further points that are essential to this work. When analyzing
evidence, Yin says, it is vital to have an analytic strategy. In order not to become bogged down
with analysis, one must have a strategy for attacking and solving the problems faced. Yin refutes
the notion that case studies must rely on statistical analysis, and instead proposed the need for
theoretical propositions. Every case study, he claims, should have a theory accompanying the
research questions. This theory guides the data collection and analysis, allowing the researcher to
organize and develop the case study. This thesis has identified a theory in order to guide the rest
of the work, as per Yin's suggestion. Second, Yin discusses the need to 'explain' phenomena. An
explanation is necessary to answer any research questions, and case studies often get stuck in a
series of causal links, looking for the direct relationship. Yin suggests the identification of all
possible explanations behind a theory and simply using discussion to help ascertain causal
relationship without making a direct assertion. This thesis follows Yin's advice, using the need
for explanation to help discuss all possible solutions to the research questions.
Sources
This thesis uses a variety of sources from which to draw information in order to complete
the case study method described above. The first source is direct observation and interviews. As
an intern at the Executive Office of Transportation in the summer of 2008, the author had a great
opportunity to take part in the day to day operations of the Green Line Extension project and
document the process. Since the end of that internship, the direct observation has continued
through constant contact with those at EOT, as well as attendance at Green Line Extension
public meetings that have been held in the winter of 2009. To further this experience and gain a
baseline of data for analysis, interviews were conducted with thirteen parties during that same
winter. The purpose of the interviews was to get a better understanding of the project from
different viewpoints, and to pose questions to those seen as experts on the Green Line Extension.
Discussion of the interviews can be seen in Chapter V.
In addition to first hand experiences, written material was a major source of information
for research. The key focus of this material was on primary documents. These documents ranged
from reports and agreements written in the 1990s through to today and included all of the critical
laws, regulations and reports. Detailed material included a report on maintenance facility siting,
maintenance facility impact, a report on tunneling alternatives for the project and many others.
Such material is important to the analysis by showing directly the arguments and foundations
that the state is laying out in order to go forward with this project. Additional primary sources
were found in the words of local experts who have watched the project since its beginning and
have recorded their thoughts, such as Fred Salvucci and Alan Altshuler. Such materials provide a
personal account without having to conduct an interview, and thus are vital to this thesis.
The final piece in the source puzzle is secondary sources, or more specifically: books and
scholarly articles relating to the topic. Research for this project has covered a wide range of
topics, including the history and use of environmental law, social choice questions and
transportation and land use planning. These sources allow us to widen the view of this analysis to
greater than just the case at hand, and compare the forces at work here to those that are seen in
other parts of the world or in the mind of a scholar. A much more in depth look at the literature is
taken in the next chapter.
Interviews
A major part of this thesis research takes place in the interviews that were conducted. The
process for securing these interviews began by creating a list of actors who are directly involved
Interview Subjects
Grouped by relationship to project
EOT Staff & Consultant Team Somerville City Staff
Kate Fichter Kristine Wickham Monica Lamboy
Steve Woelfel Regan Checcio Rob May Sergiu Luchian
John Linecheck Federal Staff Pete Butler
Congressional Staff FTA Staff
Advocates & Advisory Group Members
Eltin Reisner Ken Krause Noah Chesnin
Somerville Statewide
Rita Donnelly
Medford
Figure 10: Interview subjects
in the process, including members of the project team (from the state and private consultants)
and Somerville city employees. 5 From there, connections were made with various other
interview candidates, including project advisory group members, legislative assistants, and
federal employees. Each interview consisted of about one hour of discussion on a variety of
topics.
5 Medford city employees declined to be interviewed.
The topics for each interview were decided before any interviews began in the hopes of
making each interview as consistent as possible. A series of questions and topics was outlined,
including discussions of history, regulations, specific issues and hypothetical questions (see
appendix for a list of questions). This method of structured interviewing ensured that each
session revealed answers to the same questions from the different sources, allowing a quick and
easy comparison between the answers. Occasionally the script was left in order to pursue a topic
that arose, but it was returned to as quickly as possible. Overall, this method worked for getting a
group of answers that were both informative as well as comparable across different interviews.
The issue with interviews is that the statements given do not always match up with
actions taken. Many of the interviewees have jobs directly relating to the subject of the
interviews, and while most gave the 'appropriate' or 'correct' answer, they did not always
practice what they had preached. While that is not the topic of this thesis, it is interesting to take
note of this inconsistency. This brings up one of the major disappointments with interviews, that
the subjects are not required to consent to the interview, and often have no incentive to tell the
truth. Keeping that information in mind, the interviews in general were very successful.
Findings & Recommendations
The final portion of this research will be to identify the potential improvements and make
recommendations for future projects. By using the Green Line Extension as a case study, we are
able to postulate that some improvements to the process of this project would have helped it run
more smoothly and more quickly. By using the literature, we can compare the Green Line
Extension to other major infrastructure projects, and extend that comparison to the
recommendations made. This method allows for a series of generalized recommendations that
will be helpful to a wide range of projects and processes going forward.
Identification of Bias
It should be noted that this entire analysis may be biased in a certain direction. By nature
of having spent the summer working at the Executive Office of Transportation, the author has
clearly developed friendships and relationships that extend beyond the workplace. These
relationships have the ability to color the analysis. Such a bias would cause the analysis to be less
critical of moves and comments by the state or staffers well known to the author, and possibly
find less overall disagreement with the work done by that state on this project as a whole. This
bias may also cause other groups to be more heavily criticized due to the time spent opposing
them.
The identification of this bias, however, is the first step in mitigating it. By
acknowledging and realizing the possible meaning of such a bias, this analysis can take steps to
control the effects of any differential treatment. Such controls have included the review of
material by parties with both no bias and an opposite bias in order to flesh out any pieces of
analysis that would be considered unfair. The hope of this research is to provide a fair and
balanced analysis of the problems at hand, and the identification of this bias, combined with the
methodological steps listed above will provide such an outcome.
Chapter IV: Literature Review
The research in this thesis relies heavily on the literature and research of many other
authors working on similar and related questions. This literature review focuses on three major
themes of that literature. The first part takes a look at the history and reasoning behind the
environmental review process in the United States. Environmental review is playing a large role
in the Green Line Extension by pacing and scoping many of the planning decisions. Next, we
take a look at the history of planning in Boston, as well as at the interaction between land use and
transportation planning. Most of the disputes on this project stem from those two sources.
Finally, this literature review examines the questions of social choice and public policy. Such a
discussion is vital to understanding the core issues holding back major infrastructure projects
such as the Green Line Extension. The goal of this literature review as a whole is to inspect the
critical works that have served as a basis for analysis and see where they can link to the lessons
being learned on the Green Line Extension.
Environmental Review
The environmental review process of the United States has been around only since 1970,
and has a very simple strategy for dealing with some very complex goals. Prior to the 1960s, the
federal government had no laws regulating the environment. Interest in new laws developed in
the late 19th and early 20 th century as the public and government became more interested in
protecting the habitats and creatures that an ever-expanding nation was encroaching upon. This
led to a series of laws that were aimed at protecting a certain location or type of location
nationwide, such as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act or the Forest Preservation Act (Clark and
Canter 1997). Smaller agencies were set up in order to regulate these policies (such as the
National Park Service), but by the 1960s it was clear that this piecemeal approach to
environmental protection was insufficient for the widespread needs of protecting the
environment. This fragmentation was further complicated by divisions in the House and Senate
at the time, making regulation difficult to pass (Lazarus 2004).
As the public rallied around the message of environmental protection, the government
was slow to hear the message. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring helped to turn the tide when it was
published in 1962, and federal leaders began to realize that the mechanics of the constitution
were inadequate for overseeing both the public and private sectors in providing protection for the
environment (Andrews 1976). After much legal wrangling, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) became law on January 1, 1970 after being signed by President Nixon. As
the first piece of legislation aimed at widespread environmental protection, the long battle to
convince the federal government to invest in protecting the environment was over, but the battle
to do so had just begun.
The National Environmental Policy Act was a revelation in its simplicity and directness.
It contained only two parts, and was less than four pages long. It was debated over 10 months in
the House and Senate and received only fifteen dissenting votes on the way to becoming law
(Andrews 1976). But what NEPA lacked in textual complexity, it more than made up for in
policy nuance. It has been referred to since as the "Magna Carta of environmental policy" in
reference to the basic rights and guidelines it outlined (Lazarus 2004). The first part of the law
stated plainly the policy goals of the federal government in regards to environmental protection:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances
and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares
that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with
State and local governments, and other concerned public and private
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans. (Moore 1997)
Such a statement is plainly seen today as obvious, but in 1970, the direct policy had not yet been
articulated by the federal government. Such a policy statement in favor of finding harmony
between man and nature was a huge step for the environmental lobby.
The second portion of the law, however, created the real teeth behind the policy
statement. It created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the NEPA process that
we are familiar with today. The NEPA process is simple on the surface: for any project to get
permitting from the federal government, it must show either a statement that it will have no
environmental impact, or it must outline the exact impacts and means of mitigating them. Such a
process is so complicated that tools are necessary to help planners, developers, owners and
anyone who might encounter the process navigate its tricky waters. Such tools include Emmett
Moore's manual on the environmental process or Jacob Bregman's Environmental Impact
Statements. They serve as one of many tools that help the public and regulators understand the
NEPA process, the many amendments to the original law, and the dozens of related
environmental laws that have followed to regulate specific environmental threats (Moore 1997).
This complex process has major impacts on any infrastructure project, such as the Green Line
Extension.
The biggest debate on the status of NEPA as it relates to this research is whether the Act
itself constitutes a policy statement or a law. Lynton Caldwell outlines the argument deftly in
The National Environmental Policy Act: An Agenda for the Future. Here, he states that NEPA is
listed by the federal government as a law, but President Franklin Roosevelt had often categorized
policy as law in order to reorganize the federal government and establish policy statements.
Caldwell describes that if NEPA is considered a policy statement primarily, the directives
outlined should be treated as a sort of "Bill of Rights" for the environment, which is the approach
the original supporters wanted the Act to take (Caldwell 1998). Andrews agrees in
Environmental Policy and Administrative Change, claiming that "NEPA was a policy law, not a
procedural law" (Andrews 1976). But, he claims, the action mechanisms included in the law
have had the dual effect of helping to enforce the policy goals while simultaneously undermining
their original purpose.
This dichotomy is one of the major weaknesses seen by Clark, who writes that the NEPA
process has done plenty to prevent environmentally destructive actions, but not enough to
encourage environmentally beneficial actions (Clark and Canter 1997). Many similar analyses
outline the weaknesses of NEPA as both a policy and procedural law. Since 1970, much has been
done to improve upon the procedural issues by amending and creating new laws (Moore 1997).
But little has been done to correct the policy issues. Clark goes on to describe that the NEPA
process has never really been completely infused into project implementation, and instead sits on
the side of projects, serving mainly as yet another hurdle for planners and implementers to jump.
He calls it a "rigid paperwork exercise" instead of a way to meet the objectives originally desired
(Clark and Canter 1997). Andrews furthers the issue, stating that NEPA biggest limitation is the
"failure to significantly affect the mission-oriented organization of administrative planning and
decision making by the federal government" (Andrews 1976). This is a bold claim, basically
saying that NEPA, while important, has failed to change the basic decision making structures at
any level of government.
One method of improving upon NEPA is to look directly at the policy and procedure
itself. Andrews reminds that the most likely negative outcomes of the NEPA process include
major design changes to a project, large delays to a project or controversial litigation to solve any
outstanding issues (Andrews 1976). With these types of outcomes, it is often the case that a
project becomes undesirable to finish, regardless of the potential benefits it contains. Cleckly
takes the approach that adjusting this problem means implementing solutions from the policy
side. He describes a conference in 1992 at which the Federal Highway Administration indicated
that other legislation and newer decision making processes made NEPA obsolete. By having a
lesser importance, NEPA no longer balanced the policies originally outlined (Clark and Canter
1997). Such an approach, he writes, teeters close to unbalancing the entire system. NEPA must
become universally accepted, instead of agencies attempting to find ways to ignore and skirt its
goals. Cleckly, however, does not provide any concrete solutions from the policy perspective.
Caldwell tackles the problem from the procedural side of the issue. He writes that there
must be a significant undertaking of new law to strengthen NEPA and its subsidiaries. Caldwell
pushes for permanent committees in the House and Senate working directly on environmental
issues alone, as well as for stricter penalties for agencies and states who do not integrate NEPA
policy into their own processes. Finally, he suggests an amendment to the Constitution, giving
environmental protection the status of fundamental law (Caldwell 1998). While it is not likely
that a Constitutional amendment is coming anytime soon, Caldwell's assertion that the stick must
come before the carrot is as interesting as it is controversial. Surely, there must be methods of
improving the NEPA process that do not revolve around further complex regulations and laws.
If we needed confirmation that the National Environmental Policy Act and the
environmental review process were important, over the past decade we have gotten it. In the
almost four decades since the original policy was passed, it has been proven time and time again
that the environment makes a major difference in people's quality of life, and that environmental
review helps to quantify these differences. For example, a study from the Technion shows that
the socio-economic differences between suburbs and city have both an environmental portion,
and a financial portion. Transportation improvements can help close the gap in wage distribution,
as well environmental issues (Bekhor, Gat et al. 2008). This study is not an improvement upon
NEPA, but just one piece of evidence that NEPA works and so is indeed worth studying and
fixing.
Every critical text of the environmental protection policies of the United States
emphasizes that the policy is still misunderstood by the public at large. Hence, this makes the
process that agencies and developers need to go through completely unintelligible to the public.
As Caldwell writes, it is vital for the public to understand the broader goals of environmental
policy, and the relation of such policy to the tangible effects of economic development and job
creation (Caldwell 1998). Offringa writes that it is necessary to engage the public at every turn in
order to make the impacts of environmental review tangible. He outlines an eight step process by
which NEPA can be brought more directly into the processes of development while engaging the
public (Clark and Canter 1997). One such step involves the creation of citizen advisory
committees for individual projects. Advisory committees are becoming more formalized in
recent years, and research is beginning to crop up supporting their creation and use. One such
study by researchers in the psychology and biology departments at the Universit6 de Sherbrooke
notes that advisory groups can serve a vital role in helping bridge the gap between technical
work and public understanding, as well as serving as a medium by which to carry through the
environmental review process. These researchers did not look at transportation projects, but their
work indicates that advisory committees are a positive step towards bridging the gap, and
bringing the environmental review process closer to the people (Vasseur, LaFrance et al. 1997).
Offringa agrees, and says that by training the decision makers, as well as those who serve to
advise him, there can be a much improved environmental review process without having to make
shifts in policy or in law (Clark and Canter 1997). Such an improvement, if effective and
widespread, would have a major impact on infrastructure projects such as the Green Line
Extension.
The Green Line Extension must obviously follow the NEPA process in order to become a
completed project, but the NEPA process can also teach us a great deal about the Green Line
Extension. The most obvious point is that the GLE is constrained by the NEPA regulations and
framework. By forcing the project to undergo different levels of environmental review NEPA
gets the advantage of having all of the environmental impacts spelled out, but also can cause the
project to lose a certain amount of direction and momentum. The state relies on the NEPA
process to guide the typical process of planning, but this doesn't allow them to adjust the process
with what they feel would be the most appropriate steps. Perhaps the state feels that the
environmental impact should come earlier or later in the process. Limiting the actions taken by
the state to those outlined by NEPA limits the creativity and expertise of the planners on the
ground working on the GLE. As noted above, the NEPA process is not perfect, and so it should
be considered as part of a comprehensive planning process, and not the overbearing driver of
infrastructure planning.
The greater lesson for the GLE comes from the debate on the purpose of the original
NEPA regulation. Massachusetts, as discussed in the History chapter, has a series of regulations
and agreements (such as the 1990 ACO, the MOU and others) that intend to be policy law, not
procedural law. Writers of these documents did not trust state legislators to enforce any
document without specific outlines for the tasks to be completed, making most of the agreements
lists of projects to be constructed. But the real goal of these agreements was to turn
Massachusetts towards a policy of expanding and improving mass transportation. Unfortunately,
now they fail to complete that goal. Massachusetts is no closer to being saturated with mass
transit than in 1990, partially because efforts have been focused on checking off items on a list of
to-do projects.
The leaders of Massachusetts need to take a lesson from this important debate in the
history of the EPA. The original NEPA act had two very distinct parts: what the federal
government is doing, and how they are going to do it. Massachusetts (with some help from
federal legislation like the Clean Air Act) has skipped over that first step of defining a strategy.
Going back and correcting it would mean enacting a policy that clearly states, like the NEPA
statute, that Massachusetts is a state is in favor of improving and expanding mass transit, and will
do everything possible to undertake a process to meet those goals. If the same list of projects is
one method, that is fine - what is different is the stated commitment of the government, carrying
the weight of law, that transportation is important, and should be acted upon.
The discussion of NEPA by the above authors and others tells us that stating policy
clearly is an effective means of bringing the issue to the forefront, but this cannot be where the
effort ends. Lessons from NEPA and its critics show us that the process of directing a wide-
reaching set of policy goals is complex and never-ending. The process needs to be continually
evaluated, and the policy continually examined for changes in the current way of thinking, and
means of getting the goals ingrained into the minds of decision makers at all levels. NEPA is
certainly not perfect, and neither is the Green Line Extension, but by using the lessons of each,
an improved process can help to better carry out the goals of our wise policymakers.
Historical Overview
The detailed history of the Green Line Extension has been discussed in the previous
chapter, but this section aims to bring to light some of the written material on the Green Line
Extension. It also takes a brief look at the history of Somerville and Medford, as well as the long-
standing debate on interaction between transportation and land use.
The northern suburbs of Boston have had issues with transportation dating back to the
19th century. Somerville and Medford were two of the first communities to develop around
Boston and feed directly into it, according to Binford's The First Suburbs. As these pioneering
communities, difficulties quickly arose. These suburbs served to hold the homes of many who
worked in Boston, hence making up some of Massachusetts' first true commuters. To
accommodate these commuters, dozens of carriage lines, and later electric streetcar lines were
threaded across the Charles River and into the northern suburbs (Binford 1985). Eventually,
these became steam railroad lines, and the subway lines we know today.
Binford's work describes a situation that was not unlike many of the commuting
situations of today. Residents had to put up with congestion on bridges into Boston, high prices
for mass transit rides and pollution from trains and horses. Somerville was particularly
disappointed with decision to run railroad service through the town into suburbs that were slowly
increasing in distance away from downtown Boston. At an 1848 town meeting, town leaders
called for a resolution against the railroad companies for their damage to the urban environment
and setting (Binford 1985). In 1855, the town successfully revolted against the Fitchburg and
Boston Railroad, removing all the stops from the town (Binford 1985). To this day, the line that
now carries the Fitchburg branch of the commuter rail does not stop in Somerville. Binford
describes a 19 th century that was much like the 2 0 th century in that the public held similar
opinions on the need, benefit and weaknesses of public transit. Those lessons will continue to be
valid through the Green Line Extension today.
Literature on the more current history of Boston's transportation planning is much easier
to come by. Of the many, many works that discuss the Central Artery Tunnel project (The "Big
Dig"), two were selected for this research for their unique qualities. Machala's thesis work is
important as it takes a look at the CA/T project from the perspective of environmental justice and
from a scholarly point of view. It serves as a nice complement to this research. Luberoff's
researched history is unique in the number of contemporary interviews that make up the bulk of
the narrative. By using the opinions and memories of those who were there at the time, Luberoff
is able to recreate the CA/T project through the minds of those who created it. A more detailed
discussion of the history of the GLE as it relates to the Big Dig is found in the History chapter.
What is most interesting about these two works, however, is the piece they have left out.
The link from the Big Dig to the Green Line Extension is so often ignored. The link is even
ignored in the primary sources being used today to guide the project. Histories of the Big Dig,
such as Machala's and Luberoff's mention the desire to have mitigating projects as a political
solution, but they rarely mention them by name, discuss how they were reached, or the merits of
the individual projects. Much like the planners at the time, they leave that as an exercise for the
future. Current primary documents similarly downplay the connection between the CAT project
and the GLE, perhaps out of fear of inexorably linking the new project with the one often
associated with cost overruns and corruption. There is some modem writing on the Green Line
Extension (such as Margot Spiller's bachelor thesis "The Implications of Improved Access to
Public Transportation: The Green Line Extension"), but these are often focused on the impacts
once the rails hit the ground, and not the process to get to that point.
As Binford teaches us, ignoring these relationships can be fatal for the project. The Green
Line Extension is guided by its history, both ancient and modem. Some of the major project
sticking points are mired in an historical argument. For example, Somerville claims it has been
burdened too long by infrastructure, such as having to host two major highways, two railroads
and a maintenance facility within its borders. The state counters that the site for a new
maintenance facility has been a rail yard since the 1850s. Both points some have validity, and
both are relying on the past to make an argument without learning from the mistakes. Somerville
rejected trains in the 19th century, but due to their proximity to the city and the geography that
surrounds it, they were always going to be burdened in one way or another. Rejecting the system
now only extends that mistake of not accepting transit into the future. If able to go back and
change the past, Somerville would probably never have revolted against the railroads, and the
state probably wouldn't have had to push through a series of burdens without the consent of the
city. That chance to look back and correct mistakes from both sides is being lost by a failure to
fully appreciate and understand the history and purpose of the Green Line Extension.
The obvious part absent from this discussion is the political realities of the situation. The
Green Line Extension is mixed in with political battles and personalities. In his City
Governments and Urban Problems, Caraley discusses the complexities of urban politics. Caraley
outlines the different personality types in urban government, and how the structure of a
government has an impact on the decisions that it makes (Caraley 1977). He stresses the
importance of understanding the political realities of any given situation in order to deliver the
best outcome possible. As will be discussed further, it is important to keep the lessons of Caraley
in mind in the Green Line Extension project, as political personalities are playing a huge role in
the progress of the project.
A similar notion is that of project framing, which often is greatly dependent on the
personalities and politics of a region. In Schon' s The Reflective Practitioner, the issue of framing
is placed front and center. Along with his calls for reflection in practice, Schon calls for problem
setting to be completely separated from problem solving. He realizes that problem framing has a
huge influence on solutions, and wants there to be distance in the real world between these two
parts of the process. He notes that applying general principles to specific problems is a common
trait of planners, and feels that framing the situation interferes with that process.
The other important historical debate thus-far omitted from this thesis is the conflict
between land use and transportation. The city serves as a complex system that is made up of
countless components. The land use component of the city helps to determine the physical make-
up of locations, and what uses come together at boundaries in the city. The transportation
component focuses on how to access these different uses throughout the city. The difficulty for
planners is that these two aspects are often in conflict with one another. Creating a transportation
network can often remove opportunities for improving land use function, while sweeping
changes in land use are usually fruitless without transportation network improvements.
Planners, scholars, politicians and citizens have struggled for decades in the need to
balance these two issues that compete for physical space in the city. Research has focused on two
separate tracks. The first is a look at how each separate component has an influence upon the
other. This often takes the form of a method of measuring the city through accessibility, mobility
or travel demand. One such piece is Geurs and van Wee's "Accessibility evaluation of land use
and transport strategies: review and research directions." This paper reviews a series of
accessibility measures that are often cited to help understand the land use - transportation
interaction, including infrastructure- based, location- based and utility- based measures. Each of
these is compared and contrasted in order to evaluate the relative value of each. The second
method of research is evaluation of the city through the eyes of residents. Kevin Lynch pioneered
that strategy in his breakthrough work The Image of the City. Here, Lynch considers the visual
effects of cities while separating out the different elements of city form, such as paths, edges or
nodes. He considers how each of these plays a role in shaping the city itself, and the lives of
those who live within it. These two different approaches towards understanding the interaction
between land use and transportation tell us that there is still much research to be done.
This further research would be helpful on two specific locations on the Green Line
Extension, and would be a positive step in the project's process. At the end of the proposed
extension, the state has suggested knocking down a building to build a terminal station, but this
process would leave some open space for redevelopment. Residents and the city are clamoring
for the state to take a proactive step in designing this new space. Similarly, closer to Boston, the
state has proposed an eleven acre maintenance facility in an industrial area. Residents and the
city of Somerville are up in arms, as they see the area as prime for a land use transformation. The
state is in a tough position, as the Executive Office of Transportation is tasked with exactly that -
working out transportation solutions, not land use ones. It is a reminder of the lessons from
works such as Lynch and Guers and van Wee that the question of land use and transportation
interaction is not only difficult to grasp in the classroom, but also in the real world. A core issues
here is that the state faces difficult challenges of staying within scope while attempting to calm
the fears of those in the public, and much like the transportation and land use interactions, these
two components are often in conflict with one another.
Social Choice
The subject of policy analysis is one of much debate and research. Policy analysis aims to
determine which set of policies will best meet a set of goals, based upon the relationship between
the policy and those goals. The Green Line Extension is an interesting policy analysis case due to
vast number of decisions that need to be made in order to complete the project, and how each of
those small, individual policy decisions affects the public. These small decisions are all examples
of social choice, an aggregation to a group decision. This section examines the literature guiding
the values of policy analysis, as well as the connection to social choice theories and the Green
Line Extension.
In his innovative 1976 essay "Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays," Lloyd Etheredge
outlines the complexity of policy analysis because of problem framing issues. In this case,
students at a high school are not returning their cafeteria trays to the dishwash, and instead are
leaving them on the table for staff to clean up after lunch hour. Etheredge takes the reader
through a series of perspectives, each having their own reason for the students' behavior, ranging
from a lack of discipline to attention seeking to rebellion. Etheredge's point is that with this one
simple problem, at least thirty different diagnoses can be discussed for why it is occurring.
Which diagnosis you subscribe to is directly dependent on the frame you accept. In most policy
analysis, this is exactly the case. Within one major problem, there will be dozens of potential
answers, and the goal is to discover which answers are the most appropriate, and solve the
problem to the best degree, considering the prevailing framework. Etheredge is saying that this
maximum level of complexity might be present in any particular situation, which is why quite a
bit of policy analysis literature deals with making solutions and decisions simpler, and why
critics of 'rational choice' point to problem framing as an unanalyzed key. Sharkansky's Politics
and Policyvmaking: In search of Simplicity takes that discussion to the other extreme. Instead of
focusing on theories and predicting outcomes as many works do, Sharkansky takes the position
that policymakers must take shortcuts and simplify their decisions as a more rational and realistic
approach to policy analysis(Sharkansky 2002). These two works simply outline the boundaries
of the range of policy analysis questions that exist. Even within the Green Line Extension project
itself, there are some policies that are simple, basic and undisturbed with purpose, and some that
are open and have a range of perspectives. For example, the project team has chosen not to
disturb the NorthPoint development in Cambridge that has been permitted, but is not currently
being built, mainly because they do not want to confront that issue. That is a policy decision that
is purposefully simple and ignoring the complexity present. On the other hand, the decision as to
how to get involved in land use planning, as discussed above, is one without a limit as to the
number of possible solutions. And that policy has not yet been fully determined. This shows us
that Etheredge and Sharkansky's methods and lessons each have their place, and in the complex
real world, both solution types are prudent and necessary.
With all of this research into the depths of policy analysis, it is important to understand
why this research is tackling the question from a case study perspective. The reasoning behind
this is set out by Leslie Pal in an essay on the benefits of case study methodology. Pal
enumerates two reasons for performing a case study analysis that line up with this research. The
first is that context is extremely important. In some policy situations, it is possible to undertake
an analysis without understanding the full context of the problem. With the Green Line
Extension, as has been outlined to a great extent above and below, the context of the situation is
vital to understanding the choices being made on a day to day basis. Pal's second point is that
case studies often reveal questions and discussions that are useful in the ongoing work on said
case (Geva-May 2005). In this situation, one of the goals of this research is to be able to aid the
people working on the Green Line Extension, and other similar projects in the future. These
goals meld well with Pal's argument that the best way to undertake a policy analysis is to use a
case study methodology.
Today, there are also many new techniques for undertaking a policy analysis question.
Most policymakers use a cost-benefit analysis to attempt to understand the ramifications of
policy choices they make. On the Green Line Extension, the Federal Transit Administration uses
a similar formula of cost effectiveness in order to determine whether the project is a good
candidate for federal funding. But many decision makers have begun to broaden their horizons
when it comes to making these choices, and look for progressive methods of including all aspects
of a policy. One such popular method is multi-criteria analysis, a quantitative method using a
variety of criteria for analysis (such as ecological factors, economic development, cost, increased
transit share, etc) instead of only simple cost. As discussed by Gamper and Turcanu in "On the
governmental use of multi-criteria analysis", multi-criteria analysis has a series of benefits over
traditional analysis, such as the ability to analyze qualitative factors, and account for potential
future uncertainty. Currently, multi-criteria analysis is not legally required by any decision
making body the way that cost benefit analysis is (Gamper and Turcanu 2007). Gamper and
Turcanu feel that multi-criteria analysis allows for more freedom, and should be the primary
method of policy and project analysis worldwide. This is exactly the type of thinking that is
restricted on the Green Line Extension. The project team cannot pursue the project through this
method or any others, because the way they evaluate the project must coordinate with state law
and environmental regulation. This is one situation in which having changes at the highest levels
could have a huge trickledown effect to planning at lower levels. Allowing planners to use
alternative methods of analysis could create improved analysis.
All of this discussion, however, leads back to one vital point. Whatever solution we come
up with for analyzing the policy implications of a strategy, that policy still requires buy-in from
the public. This is especially true on a project such as the Green Line Extension which runs
through densely populated areas and near to homes and schools. We must reexamine the
question of social choice in order to help determine what solutions will be best from the public's
point of view.
The basics of social choice theory are outlined in no better place than Feldman and
Serrano's Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory. While this is an economics text, the
value is that it separates the question of social choice from public policy or planning. Feldman
and Serrano describe that economists assume that all individuals have preferences, and that these
preferences are easily expressed. Society is often faced with choices, and this theory assumes
that these choices are made by comparing alternatives, and picking the best one (Feldman and
Serrano 2006). But how do we choose which one is the best? Economists assume that individuals
pick the choice that is best for them, at the top of their preference list - meaning, has the most
utility. But in complex multiuser situations, this often leads to stalemates or solutions with no
clear consensus. In some problems we solve this through voting, but most decisions do not call
for a public referendum, and instead are decided by 'experts', politicians or planners. How do
planners decide what should be considered 'better'? This method then must have a serious flaw,
which is seen in the form of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Feldman and Serrano 2006).
Before the Impossibility Theorem, we note that this type of decision making is named the
'justificationist' model by Collingridge. He points out that any structure that can lead to this type
of inability to decide inevitably comes from a need to justify decisions (Collingridge 1982).
Justification is important, as it forces decision makers to consider the consequences of their
actions by having reasoning behind them. Without this reasoning, the public fails to understand
the motivation of their decision makers. Collingridge's argument is that justification is good for
society, but not for decision makers for the impossible tension it always creates. This is the
essence of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
In his 1951 pioneering work, Social Choice and Individual Values, economist Kenneth
Arrow first published his Impossibility Theorem. The essence is that no system of decision
making can overcome the sufficiently divergent preferences of individuals and comply with the
conditions such as reasonable criteria, non-dictatorial process and three or more discrete choices.
Arrow's work has far reaching implications for voting and other types of decision making by
basically saying that it is impossible to design a process that is acceptable to every individual and
comes up with a completely socially optimum solution. It is only possible to devise solutions that
are socially more preferable than others, but this still diminishes the opinions of some. Arrow
expanded on this work for decades, writing in his 1986 Social Choice and Multicriterion
Decision-Making that the professional decision maker should hope for "something better than
just a recipe - rather, a true method that would at least appear to have solid foundations" (Arrow
and Raynaud 1986). Work continues on finding methods of adapting Arrow's theory and finding
a way to implement processes that can overcome divergent preferences. Feldman and Serrano
discuss a handful of different approaches in their work, eventually proclaiming that "the
decisions of any social choice procedure, any voting procedure, any rule to decide what is
socially best, are suspect" (Feldman and Serrano 2006).
Feldman and Serrano instead turn to game theories in order to find a way out of their
paradox. Game theory has long been a staple of social choice questions, mainly in realm of
bargaining. As noted by Pettus in his paper, "Applying Game Theory to Collective Bargaining,"
with the awarding of the 2005 Nobel Prize in economics for a game theory application, interest is
peaking in these theories and how they affect business and social choice. Pettus is only one of
many authors to point out that while Impossibility Theorem limits many game theories, there are
still ways of outmaneuvering the problem by understanding the potential of game theory
applications (Pettus 2006). But the goal of the Green Line Extension is not to outmaneuver the
opposition, but rather come to a better solution together. Gamper and Turcanu's multi-criteria
analysis is one way around the problem. But Collingridge sees the approach as taking an even
further step back. His assertion that the current model of decision making as justificationist is
compared to his preferred choice: the critical model. His assertion is based on the fact that no
preference claim can be justified, and that no reason can be given for favoring one claim over
another (Collingridge 1982). The critical model would instead present choices as the decision
makers want them, and open them up for critical analysis. This method differs in the approach
taken from the very beginning of decision making by working to create a social choice that is the
choice of only one entity. These methods are some of the new possibilities that Arrow's work
has encouraged.
Arrow's work and the obvious paradox that exists has created an entire field of work on
solving social choice problems equitably and translating those results into practical tools for
decision makers. Arrow has even inspired a book series of essays in honor of his work. In one
such essay, Intriligator and Sheshinski discuss that a unified theory of planning must
acknowledge the difficulties outlined by the Impossibility Theorem. They separate out different
aspects of planning, such as time, space framework and organization in order to drill deeper into
this question (Heller, Starr et al. 1986). Other essays inspired by Arrow include a long-standing
series commissioned by the professors at UPenn's Wharton School. These essays examine every
aspect of decision making. One evaluates the simplistic model proposed by Sharkansky,
identifying the prime aspects for simplicity (Hoch, Kunreuther et al. 2001). Another looks at the
issues of framing decisions, and how being blinded by the framework set out at the beginning of
solving a problem is the single largest issue facing decision makers (Hoch, Kunreuther et al.
2001). One important essay is also quite basic, as Irwin and Baron remind us that values are not
the same thing as preferences. People are complex enough to understand that even if they don't
prefer something, it is often for the greater good. Values are held in order to inform opinions and
shape decisions, but should not be confused for a substitute of those (Hoch, Kunreuther et al.
2001). Arrow's influence has even extended back into mathematics, where many are looking to
find mathematical models that can be used to overcome the behavior described by Arrow. On the
cutting edge of this is a process called Analytic Hierarchy Process, which is used to aggregate
preference structures from individuals in a multi-criteria problem (Escobar and Moreno-Jimenez
2007). These types of mathematical attempts, along with the work of Gamper and Turcanu lead
towards the new direction of decision making and policy analysis.
The final piece of the puzzle is how all of this relates to the Green Line Extension. Some
of the basic models discussed above have a great deal of relevance on the project right now, or
could have relevance going forward. The policy analysis model of the "Unreturned Cafeteria
Trays" certainly holds some water for the Green Line Extension. The project aims to solve a few
simple goals, but there are many different opinions on how to reach those goals. This puts the
Green Line Extension at the crux of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem - there may not be any way
to find a socially optimum solution for the issues at hand in the project. Project team members
have been walking the fine line between Collingridge's justificationist and critical models. By
proposing plans to the public, and looking for comment and support, they are trying to get the
best of both sides, but thus far, it seems not to be working. The project team has failed to win
over most minds that are opposed to the project in general. The normal methods of planning that
they undertake are just not working to get that all important buy-in from the public.
Perhaps this means that it is time for the state to shift gears and use the work developed
by Arrow and others in order to improve the project. Such shifts could include a change to a
multi-criteria analysis model for the entire project, or a new method of game theory to use in the
public eye. They could go with a new model that helps to aggregate the preferences of the public
for maximum utility, but all these solutions require time and cost, neither of which the state has.
Instead, the most prudent approach may be to go all the way back and take another look at their
own policy, and see if the limitations of those policies in any way hinder the project by steering
it toward the Impossibility Theorem paradox or the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays multiple
solutions. That method of reflection and how it can improve the Green Line Extension will be
discussed further in the Findings and Recommendations Chapter.
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Chapter V: Discussion of Interviews
As discussed above, the majority of research for this thesis revolves around a series of
interviews conducted with planners, politicians, advocates and concerned citizens about the
Green Line Extension. In all, eleven interview sessions were conducted with thirteen different
subjects over the course of six weeks. During this time, the state released decisions regarding a
final terminus for the extension, as well as other alignment issues; and so the tenor of interviews
charged dramatically from "wait and see" to "moving forward" in only a few weeks.
In the chapter that follows, the opinions gathered in the interviews are documented and
discussed in a factual manner. 6 The issues have been broken down into a series of categories that
were identified as common topics after the interviews were completed. . These categories are:
Timeline and Deadline
Personalities and attitude
Secrecy and Pre-Planning
Public Process Issues
Decision Making and Leadership
Regulations and New Starts
Varied Viewpoints
Worried about the Future
"A Strange Process"
After the factual discussion, each topic is given a quick analysis in relation to the hypothesis of
the thesis. This quick analysis piece is the author's interpretations and meant only to sum up
personal reactions from the interviews and not to replace the following chapter, Findings and
Recommendations.
6 Due to the tense nature of discussions on the Green Line Extension, and the role that secrecy plays on the different
sides of the argument, most interviews were required to be done 'off the record'. That is to say that the opinions
included below are meant to represent no specific party or person, unless otherwise noted. To that end, none of these
opinions or comments will be cited specifically. A list of the interviewees can be found in the appendix.
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It should be noted that by promising to keep the interviews largely "off the record", there
are no assurances that each interviewee was truthful. This is a major hole in the assumptions of
the methodology, and difficult to overcome. The author believes that the vast majority of
information presented below was given in good faith, due mostly to past relationships with many
interviewees, and fact checking between the subjects. Information was given in the interviews
that was clearly and demonstrably false, and that was left out of this discussion.
The selection of the interview subjects was a two-step process. The first step was to
identify major actors from personal experience working on the project. That led to a decision to
interview planners at the state and local level, as well as some vocal advocates. From there, the
first wave of interviewees suggested other actors they felt would be appropriate subjects for
research. All of these recommendations were followed up on, except where the subject declined.
Interviewees were given nothing to prepare for the interview except for an abstract of the
original research proposal. All the interviews were conducted in the office, home or local coffee
shop of each subject. Interviews were intended to be only one-on-one, but the Ms. Lamboy
arrived with two other members of the Somerville staff.
Within the interviews themselves, subjects were led through a series of questions that
were aimed at getting them to tell their own stories of the Green Line Extension. The interview
was left mostly open-ended, with the ability to cover whatever topics the subjects saw as fitting
to the research goals. A list of interview questions can be seen in the appendix. The interviewees
were told that they were a subject in a research project on the Green Line Extension, and that it
was hoped they could provide their own individual perspectives on the process the project has
taken. By keeping the interview process as open as possible, the discussions were productive and
thoughtful.
Timeline and Deadline
As explained in the History chapter, at this moment the State Implementation Plan (SIP)
requires that the Green Line Extension be open and operating in revenue service by December
31, 2014. This is a deadline that weighs heavily on many of the actors involved in the process.
The presence of the deadline, however, has a different impact on each of these actors.
Most planners involved find the deadline to be both a positive and negative presence on
the project. The positive feeling derives from the fact that there is a sense of urgency that might
not exist if the project had no firm deadline to be completed. The 2014 date then serves as a
means to ensure that important decisions are made in a timely fashion, at least in theory. The
problem with the deadline is that there is also a worry that the project cannot be done by that
date, or that some pieces of analysis will be overlooked in the rush to meet the deadline. Without
the deadline, they argue, the project would flow more freely, spending ample time on all issues
that needed it. This, however, could allow the project to slow to a crawl, or to barely be on the
radar screen of legislative decision makers, similar to how the Urban Ring project is perceived.
Some advocates subscribe to only this side of the argument, however. These advocates
are mostly worried about the impacts to air quality, land takings, the environment and
businesses. They feel that with the project being pushed in such a manner, and so quickly
towards the finish line, important steps will be overlooked, or damming pieces of analysis
ignored in order to get the project done. This fear is quickly rebutted by the professional
planners, who claim they have covered, or will be covering, every detail at the most appropriate
time in the process.
And then there are advocates who feel that the 2014 deadline is an imaginary construct,
and while written into the law, matters very little. The deadline date was agreed to as a date at
which the state might reasonably be able to complete the project, but did not account for a
downturn in the economy, changes in state leadership, or stalling tactics from Somerville,
Medford and other constituencies (some of whom have threatened to sue the state over various
parts of the proposed project). These advocates feel that blowing past the 2014 deadline would
not be a death knell for the project, and should not lead to increased disagreement. Getting the
project done, and done the right way, is the primary objective of those holding this position.
Analysis
If the policies of EOT were more definitively spelled out for the public and other
agencies to see, the issue of the 2014 deadline could be largely resolved. The deadline was
originally put in place in order to ensure that the state would simply meet its obligations by a
reasonable time. Without the deadline, there was no guarantee the state would ever complete the
project, and this was exacerbated by a distrust in the government. The Commonwealth had not
instilled confidence in its citizens that infrastructure projects would be completed, and so the
deadline ensured that. Today, years after the Big Dig, is there a paradigm shift in Massachusetts
government? Would such a shift allow less drastic measures to be taken in order for projects to
be completed? If the policy goals of EOT were directly spelled out, and the agency head was
responsible for executing those goals, there may be no need for a deadline. The Green Line
Extension would be built, or people would lose their jobs. It might take longer, but perhaps there
would be an improved product, and greater buy-in from communities. Such a policy would make
expanding transit an overarching theme for the state, and not just a one-time occurrence.
Personalities and Attitude
One of the most consistent points of discussion in all of the interviews was the difference
in personalities that are currently working on the project. It is very clear that there are conflicts
due to personality issues amongst those interviewed. These seem to stem from a general lack of
professionalism among some parties, and lack of trust between different agencies and groups.
The personality issues manifest themselves in a variety of ways, with one advocate claiming that
"people get treated differently, depending on how loudly they yell." The problems range from
unreturned emails and ignored phone messages, up to name calling and the potential to derail the
project, simply because someone just doesn't like someone else. This is to be expected on such
an elongated and controversial project.
Everyone interviewed was of the opinion that the Green Line Extension is a great project,
and should be completed. Why then, did many interviews devolve into calling other groups
"morons", "snakes" or issuing threats? The attitude shift from the "Beyond Lechmere" Study is
considerable, and it centers around two distinct feuds. The first feud is between the state and the
cities. Somerville and Medford each have their own complaints with EOT, and vice versa, but
basically, it seems as if the EOT and Somerville staffs just do not get along. Staffers explain that
this stems from a lack of trust and respect that each is acting in good faith at all times. The other,
more public feud is that between William Wood (an anti-transit advocate on the Advisory
Committee representing Medford) and the rest of the Advisory Committee. This personal matter
has helped disintegrate meetings, cause public outbursts and added a great deal of stress to the
proceedings.
Analysis
An articulation of EOT policy would probably do little to minimize these issues,
however. These personality and attitude issues are really only the leading edge of a number of
other issues noted below, such as the level of secrecy on the project. A better policy message
would not suddenly permit different factions to get along. If there had been such a message from
the very beginning of the project, some fights may have been avoided, or improved in some way.
Secrecy and Pre-Planning
The Green Line Extension has been talked about and debated for a very long time, and so
to those who are not professional planners, it is often difficult to understand why there are
questions that still cannot be answered. This is one issue that has plagued the project for years,
and only now shows signs of letting up as engineering begins. Planners call this portion of the
project 'pre-planning' and 'preliminary engineering.' During this time, no work on the ground
(such as surveying) has actually been done, so it is difficult to say exactly where a train will be in
relation to someone's house, or how tall a canopy will be, or how many minutes it will take to
travel between stops. The planners and engineers are attempting to answer as many questions as
they can, while trying to complete the environmental documentation. After that step, the full-
fledged engineering will begin.
In most projects, like the Green Line Extension, the public wants some of these answers
as early as possible. Issues such as land takings, pollution and noise are very sensitive ones, and
EOT has attempted to be as upfront as possible with the public, telling them everything that they
know. The problem is that EOT simply has not studied some of the factors people ask for
information on. This, in turn, leads to the public feeling that the state or the city is holding back
information, which is not always the case. This, combined with some of the personality issues
breeds a lack of trust, when in reality there is just an inability to meet expectations.
In a similar vein, EOT, Somerville, Medford and the advocacy groups hold and attend a
variety of meetings with a variety of stakeholders, and there are varying degrees of openness for
each of these. The public meetings held by EOT are certainly open and announced, but minutes
are not placed on the website in a timely fashion. The staffs meet often, but minutes of these
meetings rarely are released. Advocacy groups have a better track record, usually posting
minutes of all their meetings, but the intentional and unintentional level of secrecy displayed
again plays an important role in the level of trust between the players. The lack of trust means
that there is very little honesty in these conversations, and it makes it very difficult to negotiate
or discuss issues.
Analysis
By having more clearly defined policy goals, EOT could avoid some of this distrust on
their end. Treating the policy goals as a mission statement for the agency would allow the staff to
point to them in order to back up the opinions they come into the negotiating room with. There
would no longer be any surprise as to why EOT was taking a certain approach or using a tactic
when the final goals are always known. There are certain issues this would not fix however, such
as the release of more meeting minutes, and the sense that decisions are already made before
advocates even get into the room. But having the goals outlined would help EOT have a better
public image, and perhaps take some of the stigma off of the staffs. Public policy is a tricky
domain, and even more so when people do not come to the table in good faith. Making such an
enunciated policy a tenet of the government could help to alleviate some of the ill repute the state
has gained.
Public Process Issues
A similar conundrum faces the project when it comes to public process issues. The Green
Line Extension is obviously a project that is going to have a major impact on a vast number of
people, both positively and, for a much smaller number, negatively. The goal of the planner is to
be able to balance those impacts to create the best project possible. One way of accomplishing
that is to have an open and honest public process that invites in opinions from the community in
order for the planners to be certain that all the right voices we being heard, and no issues were
being overlooked.
The Green Line Extension Advisory Group is a step towards this task, but it has fallen
quite short over the past eighteen months. Childishly, it has been beleaguered with infighting,
name-calling, mock protests and over-excited emotions. It seems as if most do not realize that at
this point in the planning, no public process is required, and any public process is above and
beyond what is required by law. Unfortunately, many at the higher levels of government do
understand this, and a lot of the effort of this group is ignored by those it is intended for.
This lack of need also plays into the lack of guidance that the Advisory Group has to
complete their tasks. Every interview subject agreed with the idea that the role of this Advisory
Group is poorly defined, and that many members do not understand it. Opinions vary wildly as to
what the role should be, but all agree that it is not working in the current form. Without this well-
defined role, the committee stagnates, and devolves into negative behavior. Any hope for good,
constructive work was tossed out the window by not having a set role to play from day one.
Analysis
These public process issues are not ones that would be solved directly by the state more
specifically defining its goals. But indirectly, it may have some impact. If one of those goals was
to always have a constructive, open process, for all portions of a project, there would be some
precedent for running the group more effectively. Some of the stumbles that helped bring about
the demise of this Advisory Group could have been avoided, and would likely be avoided in the
next iteration of such a group, as experience is a factor here. On the other hand, EOT may find it
advantageous to cleanse themselves of such a long duration of public process, and commit
themselves only to what is strictly mandated by law. This would force other agencies to step in
and fill the gap. On the Urban Ring project, for example, the EOEA sponsors the advisory group,
which allows members to answer to a separate agency than is doing the planning. This separation
is helping to diminish some of the personal issues and conflicts of interest. Such an arrangement
may make for a more controlled and productive public process.
Decision Making and Leadership
By nature, the day to day decision making process of any infrastructure project is a
complex matter. In the case of the Green Line Extension, there are a series of staff planners who
report to undersecretaries and the Secretary of Transportation, who reports to the Governor.
Many interviewees picked up on this fact, seeing it as a place of confusion for the public, and
potentially for EOT.
These observers feel that the lack of a definite stopping point on the chain of command
can become an issue. Occasionally, decisions are made at the staff level, and sometimes they
need to be worked higher up the chain. Sometimes this distinction is clear, as in the case of major
choices, such as a terminus, that must run through the Secretary. But other times, it is not as cut
and dry as to where a decision is made on the chain of command. Staffers at EOT reject this
assertion, saying that the structure is clear, and each member of the staff knows and understand
their own role.
But having a clear leader of the Green Line Extension project has been missing over the
last portion of the project. This has been caused by the fact that the MBTA ran the "Beyond
Lechmere" study, while EOT runs the environmental process. The MBTA will run the final
design, construction and operation of the project. Without one person in charge through this
entire time, many observers feel that the project lacks a sense of continuity. Some argue,
however, that having fresh voices is important, and the change has been welcome and necessary.
Analysis
Both the issues of leadership and decision making point could be improved upon with the
enunciation and use of a clearer set of policy goals for EOT and the state. If there was such a set
of stated goals, the Governor and the Secretary of Transportation would more solidly appear
behind every project without having to make statements directly in support of it. Such an
appearance is important to the public face of the project. Having the entire agency and state be
behind every project they undertake by default would be a huge lift (and huge burden), and help
to deflect some of the questions on the levels of leadership and decision making. The proposed
organizational reform of the Massachusetts transportation system should also affect this.
Regulations and New Starts
One of the biggest issues raised by all of the interview subjects was the confusing state of
regulation that guides the completion of the Green Line Extension. This regulation has
essentially two forms: environmental and financial. The environmental regulation takes the form
of the Environmental Impact Report required by the federal EPA and Massachusetts EOEA.
These regulations are well known to planners and the public alike, as they are required for all
major infrastructure projects that could have an environmental impact.
The financial regulation takes the form of an application to the New Starts program of the
Federal Transit Agency (FTA). FTA staffers describe the process as "technical assistance" to
help determine the cost effectiveness of a project, in order to aid Congress in deciding whether to
fund it. The EOT staff, however, sees the New Starts process as confusing and unhelpful. This
disagreement stems from the fact that the New Starts process is ideally supposed to be entered
into when a project is first conceived, in this case, before the "Beyond Lechmere" study. EOT
did not decide to go for New Starts funding until a few years later, making the back-tracking
difficult and time consuming. Furthermore, the New Starts cost effectiveness model does not
effectively consider economic development possibilities of a project.' These differences have led
the two staffs to be at odds, with the state hoping to push through the process in order to get
funding, while FTA holds the line of only providing technical assistance to the state, without
making a judgment.
Analysis
The debate as to whether New Starts is working is an interesting one but there is very
little that can be improved by the state establishing a better set of policy goals for the agency.
Doing anything on the state level would not have an impact on this federal legislation. There are
people working on a reform of New Starts in order to bring it more in line with the
environmental regulation that planners are accustomed to, but no changes have happened yet. In
the meantime, changes in state policy could only result in further conflict with federal staffers.
Varied Viewpoints
Each interviewee had a different opinion as to the scope and viewpoint of the project, and
this mostly correlated with the scope of their preferences. Local advocates and city employees
are focused on making sure the Green Line Extension was a good project for their municipality,
neighborhood, or even street. State and regional advocates want to be certain that the Green Line
Extension makes sense in conjunction with the entire system of public transit in Greater Boston.
Those at the state level feel a certain amount of conflict between these sets of views, and try not
to be pulled in any one direction.
7 FTA staffers were unable to give a reason why such possibilities are not currently considered as part of the New
Starts process. These issues are being partially addressed presently.
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The worry here is that if planners are only looking at the corridor of the project, they may
miss important connections or systemwide issues that can be addressed. On the other hand, if the
focus is too broad, then the planners may be missing the needs of the individual communities.
This is one of the planner's dilemmas. Every actor on the project wants their needs to rise above
the others, and balancing these is important. But how broadly should the state's planners be
looking at the project? There is no guidance from a higher level (such as the Governor or federal
regulation) on this matter. This leads to contradictory situations where the staff acquiesces to
projects such as NorthPoint, the development parcels in Cambridge, or connections that may
someday be used for the Urban Ring, or North-South Rail Link. Neither project is shovel-ready,
has permitting, or funding - but the choice has been made to value these over the potential
redevelopment of industrial land in Somerville's Inner Belt.
Analysis
This kind of decision is one that both frustrates and confuses advocates at a variety of
levels. A more enunciated policy from the state would help to guide some of these issues and
create a better sense of continuity and fairness. An articulated policy and greater accountability
would relieve the individual staff members of the burden of making those decisions, while also
making it clear to the public from the start of the project where the priorities of the state lie.
Without project specifics, such carte-blanche approval would be ill-advised, but the policy could
enumerate specifically what types of project would be supported.
Worried about the Future
Every interviewee expressed a worry about the future of the Green Line Extension
project, in both the short and long term. In the short term, there is a fair amount of trepidation as
to whether the environmental permits will be issued, and whether the project will be held up by
various interests. But the bigger fear is what happens after the environmental permits are issued.
Due to the complicated nature of Massachusetts' transportation structure, at that point, the
project changes hands from EOT to the MBTA for final design and construction. The Design and
Construction office at the MBTA will become the lead, and there will again be a new face of the
project, and a new staff to deal with. Many in the community are worried that the time and effort
put in by the EOT staff will be wasted by a potentially less caring MBTA staff. There is even the
feeling that the MBTA does not want the project, due to increased operational costs, and so will
try to delay or even ignore the project. Whether any of this will actually happen waits to be seen,
but the uncertainty is very worrisome for many advocates.
Analysis
Having a pronounced policy for the state on transportation projects would likely make a
major improvement on this uncertainty. With such a policy, it would emphatically be the goal of
the entire state government to complete the Green Line Extension, and there would be less worry
about one agency having a different agenda than another agency. Furthermore, with such a
policy, it would be easier and more likely for staffers to continue in their roles, even as the
project shifts hands, or for the project to be constructed by EOT itself. This type of continuity
would go a long way towards helping quell a lot of the fear that currently permeates the future of
the project.
"A Strange Process"
One thing that was very consistent over all the interviews was the insistence that the
Green Line Extension is a "strange process" and different than any of the projects people had
worked on or been witness to. Clearly, the circumstances described above warrant this
description. Between the legal wrangling, the hard deadline, the conflicting interests, different
advocacy groups and dozens of other issues, the Green Line Extension might be one of the
strangest, most complicated transit projects most have ever worked on. But why is this factor
important for improving the efficiency of getting projects done?
If the state is able to control and improve upon the process that surrounds these complex
projects, it should be able to make the simpler projects even better, and easier to complete.
Having a complex problem is not a vice, but can be seen as an opportunity to really improve
upon the system that is used to solve all sorts of easier problems. But, would having an
enunciated and utilized policy towards major projects have an impact on this issue? It is hard to
say at this point. By limiting some of the issues discussed above, a process would become less
complicated and strange, but there will always be some project that breaks all the rules and is
outside the box. So, an articulated policy is a wild card in this case, it is unknown whether there
would really be an improvement in project efficiency.
Chapter VI: Findings and Recommendations
The crux of this thesis is the findings that have come from the interviews, literature
review and personal experience, and the recommendations that stem from those findings. The
goal is to uncover methods of improving the efficiency of the Green Line Extension, and to shed
light on methods for improving other large infrastructure projects. The hypothesis states that with
an enunciated public policy, the state would be able to more efficiently complete the project.
What follows is a series of findings from the research, followed by recommendations for each
individual finding. A summary chart of these findings and recommendations (Figure 12) is found
at the end of the chapter.
Importance and Use of Policy Definitions
Most of the discussion in this thesis has centered on the need for policy definitions that
are enunciated to the public and used by the state. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts does
not currently have a stated policy on the expansion of mass transportation. The only
commitments come in the form of the legal requirements and agreements that have been signed
over the years. This type of structure emphasizes a pessimistic feeling that the state has no
interest in expanding transit services, and is doing it only to avoid being sued. This makes many
in the public skeptical of the intentions of planners and the goals they strive to meet.
The research has showed that having a policy definition is important, and can help to
avoid many of these issues the state faces. The most prominent policy definition discussed here
has been the opening of the Environmental Policy Act of 1969. By having such a broad,
definitive statement at the beginning of the law, stating the goals of the federal government, the
EPA was much more forceful as a regulation. The policy statement to begin the law set the tone
for the environmental movement on the federal level. Within a decade, dozens of supporting
laws had come onto the books, and thirty years later, the EPA is one of the primary drivers
behind any infrastructure project. Environmental protection is one of the primary issues in the
federal government, and while we cannot say it is because of that policy statement, having the
statement is certainly one factor that has led to the prominence of environmental policy.
Information from the interviews also reveals the need for a strong public policy
statement. Most of the interviewees felt that in one way or another that the Green Line Extension
project lacked direction and purpose. This manifests itself in the lack of productive activity from
the advisory group, disagreements between city and state planners, stagnation of work products
and a general lack of trust that the project will ever be completed. Solving these types of issues
will be the biggest single improvement for both the Green Line Extension, and all major
infrastructure projects.
Once this policy is in place, it is important to use the policy effectively. This means that
there must be someone accountable for the execution of the policy. The literature shows us that
these two pieces in conjunction are vital to the success of implementing a policy definition.
Many major projects use this strategy to help the process. Luberoff and Altshuler remind us
constantly that Fred Salvucci was accountable for the state's actions during the Big Dig, and
there was no doubting that he was the person in charge. Other cases in Massachusetts include the
Harbor Cleanup, or Southwest Corridor. Nationally, projects such as the 1984 Summer Olympics
were headed by one person (Peter Ueberroth), who was accountable for the entire process.
Existence and use of policy must go hand in hand, much the way the Supreme Court uses the
Constitution to base individual decisions - one must support the other.
From the findings above, it is clear that the state needs to more specifically and clearly
define and use policy that relates to transportation infrastructure improvements. Currently, the
state does this on a case by case basis by supporting a particular project (such as the Greenbush
line) or a specific policy (such as accelerated bridge replacement). But such an act does not
signal to the public, the cities and even the state employees that the Commonwealth is serious
about getting behind their project and others like it. By enunciating a policy on expanding transit,
the aim would be to alleviate the concerns that the state is committed to completing the Green
Line Extension, and not just going through the motions of review in order to fulfill the legal
requirement. The staffers currently have no such cover, and it leaves them open to criticisms that
the state has no intention of completing the project, or is proposing controversial ideas solely as a
means of getting the project shut down. Such accusations and attitudes stifle the project's
progress and seriously affect the morale of those working on the project. The drawback to such a
policy is the potential political capital it uses, and the necks it puts on the chopping block. Such a
statement effectively prioritizes transportation over other efforts of the government, and to do so
would require a buy-in from legislators. The risk to and use of political capital may be high, but
it is worth it for a situation that, if improved, can have both transportation and economic benefits
for the state.
When Governor Patrick announces such a policy, he would be wise to model it after the
effective policy statement in the Environmental Policy Act. The state would publicly recognize
the benefits of expanding and protecting mass transportation of any form. Such a policy should
outline the benefits of transportation infrastructure in the Commonwealth, such as increased
mobility, reduced pollution from automobiles and economic development. Furthermore, the
policy would state that the importance of transportation should not fall below a certain level in
the priorities of the government. Finally, the policy would task the state and local governments
with using all practical means and methods for improving, maintaining and expanding public
transportation in Massachusetts. Such a policy would have massive spillover effects into the
series of recommendations below. The policy would need to keep its potency through regime
changes in the Massachusetts government as well by becoming a law. It would also help improve
many of the social choice issues that have been discussed by bringing more perfect information
to each situation. Overall, given the evidence of policy value in other cases and the Green Line
Extension history in courts and public opinion, enumeration of a pro-transit state policy with
accountability would be a significant and timely step.
The Need for Reform
Massachusetts has recently embarked on an effort to completely reform the transportation
structure in the state. Such changes could include the imposition of a higher gas tax to support
maintenance and transit improvements, consolidation of multiple quasi-public agencies and
streamlining of the public process. The Patrick administration has undertaken this reform to try
and help save some money on the state level and to reduce the costs passed on to users through
fares and tolls. Proponents of reform have been calling for it in Massachusetts for years, which is
a symptom of the lack of obvious direction the state wants to take transportation policy.
Reforming the transportation system is an important underlying tone in the research done
in this thesis. The establishment of the EPA was a complete paradigm shift in environmental
policy. Placing one agency in charge of regulating only the environment ensures that none of the
necessary steps are overlooked or the trust obscured. The Environmental Policy Act completely
reformed the way the federal and state governments look at environmental policy. Much of the
literature also is sensitive to the idea of reform. Caraley's work on city governments outlines
how sensitive policy can be to changes in the framework of government and politics. Gamper
and Turcanu call for a shift, not in the structure, but in the ideology of planning. These authors
show that reforming and adapting a system can be an important step in getting the better
outcomes we deserve. Almost all of the interviewees mentioned the Massachusetts reform
possibilities, and felt that they could make a big difference to the project. With reform can come
hope, and the idea that it is possible to evolve the system, which can lead to much more efficient
infrastructure projects.
The underlying goal of any transportation reform would be to increase the level of trust in
transportation planning by eliminating redundant steps, removing roadblocks and making a show
of effort to improve relationships. Despite the fact that there is no proof organizational reform
will perform such goals, reform needs to happen in some form. The most important reform
aspect is ensuring that policy matches the new governmental structure. If the state wants to
reduce redundancy, and restructure agencies, that is a worthwhile goal, but is has little meaning
without policy statements that back up why the state is undertaking such a project. The
importance of policy definitions has been discussed, and if the Governor or legislature wants to
make sweeping changes, that importance is magnified.
The second important task of reform is to do as much in one change as possible. Reform
for the system only works in regulated doses, as pointed out in much of the EPA criticism
literature. If the structure of government is changed over and over again, those who work within
the government will have a difficult time getting their jobs done, and potential hires will always
be wary of the lack of job security. It may be more difficult to get the entirety of a reform
package done at one time, but the benefits down the line make it worthwhile. Transportation
reform in Massachusetts means that some people may lose their jobs, or lose benefits they were
counting on. Such an occurrence is going to have a significant effect on the morale of staffers,
and by association, the efficiency of projects. Getting the reform done as quickly and efficiently
as possible means that it will pose the least amount of threat to the projects in the pipeline.
Personalities and Trust
One of the most important findings of this research is probably also the most obvious
finding. Personalities and trust play a huge role on the Green Line Extension and all major
projects. This is backed up first by a great deal of the primary and secondary documents. Even
dating back to the beginning of this project, it is obvious that there was a lack of trust. If there
had been trust between Governors Dukakis and Weld, there may not have been the need to agree
to any legal agreements with CLF in the first place. Putting down the agreements in writing
removes any doubt over who had trusted whom. Almost all of the social choice research that
exists deals with the differences between perfect and imperfect information. They acknowledge
that there are many situations in which perfect information is not available, and how much of a
difficulty this is for decision makers.
Every single one of the interviewees made a point to mention the differences in
personalities and lack of respect on the project. Their different perspectives have been outlined in
the preceding chapter, but here we discuss how each group is has caused this lack of respect.
Advocates take the least of the blame, but their contribution is perhaps the most damaging. Most
of the public comes to meetings with a much more negative perspective than those who have
been involved on the project. It is the role of the informed advocates to help bridge that gap and
emphasize the good work that has been done on the project while still calling for work on the
issues. By failing at that, the advocates undermine the project as a whole. A special exemption
should be made for 'anti-advocates', those who are obviously against the project, such as
William Wood, and who use their abrasive personalities and threatening tactics to attempt to
derail the project at every possible step. The state has the most difficult job to do but also has
some major failings when it comes to trust and respect. It is clear that the state does not treat all
inquiries and advocates equally, giving greater weight to those who can cause them more
problems, which exacerbates the trust issue. They also have a tendency to go behind closed doors
for meetings or internal debate, which, while sometimes proper, only serves to heighten the fears
of those in the public. This also serves to undermine one of the project's goals of openness.
Finally, however, the most destruction to respect and trust comes from the cities. The city
of Medford chooses to basically not participate in the project, leaving the cities advocates to fight
without knowing if their mayor is behind the project or not. Such a situation creates a high level
of suspicion in Medford. But the planners and politicians of Somerville take the grand prize.
These are people who speak differently in public than they do behind closed doors to the state
and to the local advocates. They are quite simply playing both sides while Mayor Curtatone
appears to speak out of all sides of his mouth. Interviews with the state staff and advocates
clearly shows that Somerville encourages the state to find better solutions, and says they will
work together in supporting the project, while telling the advocates to raise their voices and help
stop the state's progress. This dichotomy is compounded by the abrasive nature of the city
employees, one of whom was deeply involved in the process, and was either fired or left the city
in the middle of it. This abrasive nature has led to vocal arguments and a much diminished level
of communication between the city and state staffs, as the two just do not get along. This is not
to blame the entire Somerville staff, just to say that it is obvious that trust, respect and
personality issues are a major problem on the Green Line Extension project.
It is clear that one of the biggest issues facing the Green Line Extension, and many
infrastructure projects, is the conflict of personalities and lack of trust and respect amongst those
working on the project, and this threatens to completely derail the project. But the issue of
personality also proves to be one of the most elusive to solve, especially for a project as
protracted as the Green Line Extension. One method would be to simply replace all of the people
currently working on the project in order to try and create some agreement with new staffs.
However, this would obviously not work, as the current staffs are too entrenched, and know the
project too well. Somerville has taken a step by replacing their brusque Director of
Transportation, and this should go a long way. But wholesale replacement is certainly not the
answer if the project is still to be completed on time.
Perhaps it is better to look at the problem from a perspective of agreement, instead of
personalities. We do not need the staffs and advocates to like each other; we just need to be able
to come to some agreements in order to move the project forward. One such solution would be
structured mediation between the parties. Have an outside client come in and work with all of the
project's actors in order to help find the points of agreement, and find solutions for the points of
disagreement. Using such a mediator would be a radical departure from the typical project
process, but in this case could be effective in helping to solve some of the arguments, assuming
all the parties agree to live by the mediator's ruling. Similar structures are sometimes used more
normally within the project process, as discussed earlier. The use of an advisory group can help
to fill this mediating role, especially if the group reports to an outside agency, as one article
suggested. This outside influence can help control some of the potential disagreements and
personality conflicts. Another strategy would be to adopt some of the cutting edge analysis tools
discussed in the literature review, such as multi-criteria analysis. If all parties agree to abide by
the results of a quantitative analysis, there may be less bickering about decision making. Overall,
these are solutions that take the ball out of planners' hands. The planners need to find ways of
working together to solve these conflicts, and while these solutions could work, the most
effective would be for everyone to simply grow up and start being honest and respectful.
Silo & Viewpoint Issues
The interviews also uncovered the interesting problem of silo issues on the Green Line
Extension. The term 'silo' in this case is meant to refer to perspectives or issues that are
compartmentalized and only looked at from one point of view. For example, an abutter to the
proposed line may only see the issues relating to his quality of life, instead of the overall impacts
or benefits. Silo issues are not necessarily a bad thing, as most advocacy groups silo themselves
in some way. For example, the advocacy groups on the Green Line Extension generally limit
themselves to a location, town or issue, which helps them in controlling the situation and
presenting the best possible argument.
But there are silo issues that are hurting the Green Line Extension, and they relate to the
reform and policy issues stated above. The major silo issue revolves around the tasks of each
staff. The state staff working on the project is from the Executive Office of Transportation, and
so they focus on transportation issues. The staffs from the cities are from economic development
departments, and hence have a broader spectrum of issues to deal with. To complicate the matter,
the city staffs are much closer to their overall executive (the mayor) than the state staff is to the
governor.
What this all basically means is that the staffs do not see eye to eye sometimes because
they are tasked with looking at different issues. It is much easier for the mayor of a city to be
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deeply involved with something that affects his entire town than a governor with a project that
affects three of his 351 towns. This is especially true when the project has costs and benefits that
fall unevenly across towns, which is why state-level aid packages this issue along with others to
make it palatable to a wider audience. This disconnect in viewpoint has led to a lot of
disagreements on the project, and will certainly continue to hamper it going forward. It is also
one that many people fail to see and acknowledge, despite the issues it clearly causes.
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Deval
Patrick
The problems surrounding silo issues have led to an unbalancing of the Green Line
Extension project. The various sides of the project each have scopes that are not equally
matched, making some discussions difficult. This issue only further underscores the need for a
comprehensive strategy for investment in public transportation. This goes beyond the policy
statements and structural reform towards an approach for an across-the-board set of policy goals,
structural changes, financing options, governmental oversight and planning procedures.
The catch is, the process for such a strategy already exists, and the Green Line Extension
is not working well within that system. Planners and politicians recognized this issue for regional
problems years ago. This is one of the main reasons that the municipal planning organization
(MPO) system was established. The MPO system creates an intermediate level of government
between the state and the cities in order to help bridge that gap between the two. With
representation from both sides, the MPO's aim is to allow transportation planners to come
together with community planners and economic planners in order to solve issues affecting an
entire region. Somerville, Medford, Cambridge and Boston are all members of the MPO for the
Boston Region (BRMPO). BRMPO however, is not being well utilized on the Green Line
Extension. BRMPO can be used more as a mediator and a place for collaboration between the
different levels of government. In particular, members of the MPO (such as the Metropolitan
Area Planning Council) have land use planning expertise as the regional planning organization
for the area. Organizations such as MAPC have shown the technical ability and have sufficient
personnel to address some of these collaborative issues. By utilizing this currently under
employed tool, the Green Line Extension might be able to solve many silo issues and move
forward.
Constraining Regulations
Another recurring theme from the research on this thesis is the role that constraining
regulations have played in the past, and factor into the future of the Green Line Extension. The
past is mostly shaped by the environmental regulations. As has been discussed, the long history
of agreements and laws and regime changes have led to the Commonwealth being locked into a
project for the past two decades that they have yet to complete. The Green Line Extension being
a legal commitment is not necessarily a negative aspect, but it is something that all the parties
involved acknowledge and understand as having a significant affect. All of the interviewees
agreed that the project has hit certain hurdles because it is legally mandated, and that different
tactics are used on this project than others. The environmental review process is not seen as a
constraint by the planners, however, because they have been trained in working within the
process, and are used to doing such for all their projects.
The most constraining part of the project is certainly the New Starts regulations. The
frustration with New Starts manifests itself in three ways. The least obvious is the public's lack
of knowledge about the process. Most in the public (or outside the state offices) do not
understand New Starts, and do not want to. They want the project completed, however it can
happen. So, New Starts' serious obstacles are not seen by the public and they do not understand
why the state is slowed down by them. On the state level, the most damaging manifestation
occurs: the constraining of the rest of the project because of New Starts. Because the process for
federal funding is open-ended and vague, the project sponsors have no idea when and if they will
be approved. This slows down everything, and requires them to complete additional
documentation above and beyond the environmental review. As of this writing, the project team
still does not know if they will be approved for federal funding, and if so, when. This leads to the
final frustration with New Starts: the coy nature of the Federal Transit Administration staff.
From speaking to them, it is clear that they avoid getting involved with projects directly in order
to keep their professionalism, but this leads to them seeming defiant and aloof. This attitude,
much like the personality issues discussed above, does nothing to further the progress of the
Green Line Extension, and in fact holds back the project overall.
The issue of constraining regulations is not one that can be solved at the state level. The
Massachusetts regulations reflect the federal regulations in almost every case. If a change is
going to be made to any legislation, it needs to be first made at the federal level in order to ease
the burden on planners. Then care should be taken in order to ensure that the issues experienced
on the Green Line Extension are indicative of further problems, and not just one time
occurrences. From the research and interviews, it is clear that most professionals do not find the
environmental regulations to be constraining. There are certainly ways in which the
environmental process can be streamlined or improved, based on both the Green Line case and
readings. But most feel that changes are simply not necessary; most likely because they are used
to working within that system.
New Starts is an unfamiliar system to most planners, however, and its process is one that
could use some serious changes. Those interviewed who had worked on multiple projects
involving federal funding, identified New Starts as an issue that extends beyond the Green Line
Extension. The primary change to New Starts should be aligning it with the environmental
process, both in product and time. Currently, the New Starts process requires a completely
different set of documents than the EIR process. Planners should be able to prepare one product
for federal review, from any department that needs to see it. This could mean an expansion of the
information required in the EIR to incorporate some of the needs of New Starts, but in the end it
should be one singular document. The time issue arises when projects want to move through
their environmental review, but are held up in looking for federal funding. Changing this requires
concessions from both sides. The state should submit a document for review from both EPA and
FTA at the same time, thus making any decisions on funding come at the same time as
environmental review, not before. But the FTA must agree to render a decision within a certain
frame of time. On the Green Line Extension, the FTA has not made a recommendation in over a
year of having the project in the pipeline. This limbo is unacceptable. Merging these two
processes together would take a lot of pressure off of understaffed, underfinanced state and local
offices, and allow the federal government to make a recommendation without becoming a severe
hindrance to the project process.
One additional method to make navigating the maze of regulation easier for planners is to
allow for a flexible project delivery method. Design and implementation are meant to be
adaptable depending on the project. Regulations by definition are not adaptable, and instead
attempt to force every project into the same hole. For transportation planning to be more
successful, the regulations do not need to be successful, but the means of using them do. Allow
planners to chart their own course through the waters of environmental and financial regulation,
and support that method of planning. Doing so will have an immense impact on the ease and
efficiency of all types of projects.
Money Talks
In the end, the Green Line Extension will likely come down to a decision about money.
Funding is the biggest obstacle between the project and completion, and everybody involved
knows it. The subject of how to find the money for the Green Line Extension came up in every
single interview in one way or another. Every advocate and planner fears that the state will not
have enough money to build or operate the line, and thus the project will fall by the wayside. The
money problem also rears its head in a discussion with New Starts, as described above. Most
planners feel that without federal funding, the project has no hope of survival. The question of
money also often arises in the conflicts between state and cities. The cities want the state to be
working on more advanced solutions, or doing land use planning and economic development for
certain sites along the line. But the state finds themselves without enough money to complete all
the requests, or meet all the demands of the public.
The Green Line Extension's money woes do have one benefit. The money problem is
something that everyone can understand and relate to. Planners, politicians, advocates and
residents can all agree that the money for this project must come from somewhere, and that no
one has enough to complete the project right now. The money problem serves as a way for all the
people interested on the project to come together on one issue. It is possible that going forward,
we will see a much more united front on the Green Line Extension, with everyone asking the
state and federal government to support the project with funding. Such an agreement and
movement together would go a long way towards healing some of the wounds the project has
caused thus far.
The lack of funding for transportation projects is an obvious problem with no obvious
solution. The Green Line Extension has tried to look for federal funding via New Starts, and the
transportation reform has one eye towards funding these types of projects. It is not the aim of this
research to find new, innovative funding sources for transportation projects, but more efficient,
more complete projects certainly do have an advantage in getting funding. The goal is to help
bring these projects to the level by which these funding sources will be more abundant. For
example, the Green Line Extension could have been included in a stimulus bill if it was closer to
being a final product, or it could be the beneficiary of an outside donor. But right now, the Green
Line Extension is in no place ready for that type of financial commitment, due to many of the
findings that have been discussed.
The recommendations thus far bring the project closer, however. A commitment from the
state government in the form of policy and reform would show the federal government how
seriously the project was being considered. By implementing overarching strategies, using
mediation techniques and streamlining New Starts, the Green Line Extension could be a lot
closer to completion. Funding for this project will come from a new gas tax, or federal monies,
or a state commitment, but it will certainly not come while having a half completed project. As
much as it hurts to work on a project for years, only to find that it cannot be funded, that is a
much better situation than never completing the work on the project in the first place.
Trust in Planners
This thesis has discussed many times the differences between believers and non-believers
in the planning process. The Green Line Extension has unfortunately converted many of the
believers into non-believers over the course of these past few years. The issue with the non-
believers is that they are slowing down and stopping up the planning process without adding
anything constructive to the process. That is not to say that those people should be ignored or
prevented from interfering with the planning process, but it is shocking how many people refuse
to work on the problems they have constructively, both professionals and citizens.
Schon addresses these problems extensively in his work, The Reflective Practioner,
referring to the "crisis of confidence" professionals have had over the past decades. He relates
the crisis to the political and social changes of the United States, claiming that the disbelief
comes from both the professionals and the public (Schon 1983). Schon calls for reflection within
practice in order to bring the professionals out of this confidence crisis, but does not pose any
real solutions for bringing along the public as well. He notes that city planners in particular
tackle a set of phenomena (such as poverty, crime and congestion) that are resistant to
intervention. Planners, he claims, must also often serve interests opposing their personal views,
and the effect that this has on the public is quite large. Overall, Schon is saying that lack of trust
in planners is nothing new.
It is the ultimate finding of this thesis that planning has not failed on the Green Line
Extension, but that trust in planners has failed. Without a level of trust for those who are tasked
with finding good solutions and planning for the best for all of us, there is simply no way that the
project will succeed. It may be built under those circumstances, but it will not be seen as a
productive project that is good for the community unless that trust is restored. Without a
restoration, planners in Massachusetts will continue to be seen as part of the corrupt arm of the
government that builds projects so that friends can have jobs and unions supported. The Green
Line Extension poses one of the real opportunities to get out of that rut, but thus far, all the
research and interviews show that is not close to happening.
All of the above discussed recommendations are a means of improving the relationship
between planners, streamlining the planning process, interacting with the public or finding ways
to make projects better. But none of these recommendations by itself is going to change a non-
believer into a believer. There is no magic bullet to establishing trust in a public situation
according to Arrow, Collingridge, Feldman and Serrano or Schon. There is no easy way to repair
broken trust, except with time, willing parties, or a complete turnover in personnel.
Massachusetts has potentially broken the trust of all its citizens, especially when it comes to
infrastructure projects. But moving forward with reform could bring a greater trust in planners.
Having greater accountability within the government will bring a greater trust in planners. And
sharing our common problems, by working together for solutions will undoubtedly bring a
greater trust to planners and the planning process.
Completing the above recommendations will be one step towards getting a greater trust
on the Green Line Extension. Completing them for all projects going forward will improve the
trust over time. But disbelief in planners will never disappear. Much like any profession, there
are ways of improving the relationship between planners and the public. For example, Kate
Fichter may stay in the public eye for years, working on the Green Line Extension and similar
projects. If over that time she is able to build a reputation as someone who is honest, trustworthy
and respectful, years from now she will lead a project that will have a higher level of trust. But to
get to that point takes time, thoughtful consideration and hard work. Trust in planners will never
be absolute, but it most certainly can be improved.
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Recommendation
Organizational reform is an
Need for Reform important aspect of improving
governmental systems
Comprehensive reform is
necessary in Massachusetts
Use the MPO system to bridgePlanners from different levels Use the MPG system to bridgeSilo and Viewpoint Issues of government do not see eye the gap between city and state
to eye
Money Talks No one knows where the
money will come from
Keep advancing the project so
it is ready for construction
when money does exist
Figure 12: Summary Chart of Findings and Recommendations
101
I
Finding
102
Chapter VII: Conclusions
This thesis has examined the process of getting the Green Line Extension to Somerville
and Medford, and the impact that the project will have going forward on future infrastructure
projects in Massachusetts. Along the way, through candid interviews, in-depth literature analysis
and a comprehensive reflection on personal experiences, this thesis has unraveled why such a
popular and well-received project has stumbled along the way. We have explored the personality
conflicts, constraints in government, checkered history and mismatched priorities that stall such
an important part of our transportation future. But most importantly, we have investigated
whether more defined policy statements and manifestation of that policy would improve the
situation and whether trust in planning has failed.
This thesis set out to examine the question: How does the process by which a project is
undertaken have an effect on the outcome of such a project? The process of the Green Line
Extension is a strange one, as confirmed by the interviews, but it is not clear exactly what effect
that will have on the outcome of the project. One of the shortcomings of this research has been
the inability to properly evaluate that aspect of the question. This conclusion summarizes the
biggest consequences of the research, explores the limitations, and postulates some ideas that
could guide any future research.
In the meantime however, we have this analysis, which has looked at how to make the
Green Line Extension more efficient and effective. The original hypothesis stated that an
articulated and utilized policy on improving public transit would have improved the efficiency of
the Green Line Extension and other similar projects. This research has concluded that the
hypothesis is likely to be true, but it is unclear how much improvement would be seen. There is a
limit to how much we can say about what would have happened if the clear policy had been
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asserted earlier. At this point in the project, there are a few plausible alternative scenarios, but all
relate back to the common call of 'not in my backyard.' Etheredge explained in "The Case of the
Unreturned Cafeteria Trays" that different explanations of the problem at hand often can lead to
different diagnoses and solutions. On the Green Line Extension, there are many different
explanations for the delay of the project, and for the reasons behind each individual call of 'not
in my backyard'. Each of these different explanations leads to a different potential solution, very
few of which are implemented. These variations are the type of situation in which a policy
mandate solution is appropriate. As discussed in previous chapters, the creation of a more
defined and useful policy could have the impact of eliminating some of the smaller questions
about whether the state is truly committed to the project. This research indicates that many of
these different explanations described by Etheredge would be amenable to this policy-based
solution.
Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" reiterates that there is no process by which to find a
socially optimal solution, when the actors have sufficiently divergent optimal solutions, as they
do on the Green Line Extension. This is not the first project to face this harsh reality, nor will it
be the last. There are no easy answers to these types of questions, but the mistrust on the Green
Line Extension is likely to lead to forced outcomes that are far from any preferred alternative -
that is to say, worse for everybody involved. The Green Line Extension may be delayed, or may
never be built if there can be no consensus or agreement as to where to place physical aspects of
the light rail line, such as the maintenance facility, head houses or sound barriers. At this
moment, the entire project is in fear of collapse due to generic and specific complaints about
physical aspects of the project, as well as a decided lack of funds. But there is a process that
brings the project closer to a generally preferable solution - not all the way to one, simply closer.
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And there are a few things that could have been taken advantage of, and should be used going
forward to achieve those goals. Arrow's theory may define the constraints that currently
surround the Green Line Extension, but this thesis has suggested that there may be steps to take
to avoid some of the pitfalls.
Thus far, this thesis has proposed a series of these generic repairs to, and steps for the
Green Line Extension process, and it is not the focus of this research to take those potential
repairs to the next level. But, it is important to enumerate what some of those changes may look
like. Specific changes in Massachusetts would take place on a variety of levels. A policy from
the state's executive and legislative branches could spell out that the state must complete mass
transit projects, and get them done correctly. There would obviously be limits to how such a
policy would work, and a need to create specific definitions and limits. A law to back that up
would specify a dedicated finding source for these projects, such as California's dedicated sales
tax, and would ensure that the policy remains as an enforceable law. Furthermore, the law must
outline exactly who in the government is responsible for carrying out the mission, in order to
create a level of responsibility. The next step might be to bring transportation planning under one
roof in Massachusetts, eliminating separate agencies such as the MBTA and Turnpike Authority.
Combining these with the economic development agencies would also make a great deal of sense
and would serve to streamline the process. Another important step would be to further separate
decision makers from hands-on planners. This would allow planners to present decision makers
with many different solutions to a problem, and let them decide what the best possible outcome
is. Now, these two roles are so coupled that planners have a hard time effectively evaluating
alternatives and presenting the best possible analysis. Other changes have been proposed
throughout this research, including a revamping of relevant legislation, mediation ideas, and
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personality conflict resolutions. The planners involved must work harder at answering the
questions that no one wants to tackle. Potentially, mitigation efforts could be financially ties to
cost cutting in other places. Is it worth it for Somerville to fight a maintenance facility in Inner
Belt that may lead to better mitigation along the line? Should these tradeoffs be contingent on
each other? All of these real-world decisions help to bring the project closer and closer to the
Pareto-optimal frontier we have been striving for.
Most of these changes could only be applicable at certain times within the project, such
as at the beginning of the process, or at a turning point somewhere in the middle. If there had
been major shifts in the project process years ago, the Extension may be completed by now, or
been able to tap into available federal funding (such as by being 'shovel ready' in time for 2008
stimulus money). But the calcification of personalities and attitudes means that moments where
such changes can be made are few and far between. I believe that the moment is right now for
such changes on the Green Line Extension. With the environmental process being finished, the
project is moving full force into engineering. Politically, both the Governor and legislature are
pushing for organizational reform of our transportation structure. The MBTA and Turnpike
Authority are both struggling due to questionable leadership and financial issues. The public and
media have been pushing for major changes in our transportation. Right now is the time to enact
some of these sweeping changes and repairs to the project process. Doing so now could delay the
Green Line Extension. But after a period of time, the project will be able to move forward with
greater purpose and drive, creating a better project through better process.
These suggestions for improving the Green Line Extension process are not entirely
specific to this project. These solutions are mostly organizational, and could be adapted to reform
many different situations. The general principles of articulating policy, reforming organizational
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structure and holding people accountable are applicable similar process issues. In Massachusetts
alone, there are a variety of projects upcoming that have the potential to face similar issues that
the Green Line Extension has faced, such as the Urban Ring or Charles River Bridge
Rehabilitation. The repairs made to the system now will have an effect on these projects,
hopefully keeping them from running into the same problems as the Green Line Extension
process and repeating history. The lessons learned on the Green Line Extension will certainly be
relevant again. People will always ask: How does the process by which a project is undertaken
have an effect on the outcome of such a project? This thesis by no means answers that question
completely, but the only way to find that answer is by adding bricks to the wall one at a time.
The Green Line Extension, regardless of its outcome, is one such brick in the wall.
The biggest take away from this research, and the most damming, is the assertion that
trust in planners has failed, stemming from a divergence of viewpoints, abrasive personalities, a
history of mistakes and various other issues. I feel confident asserting that trust in planners has
failed the Green Line Extension, but there are certainly some who would disagree. Regardless,
the most important discussion regarding trust is the methods of repairing it. Thus far, this thesis
has declared that the most effective way to repair trust is through time, allowing it to repair
naturally. The counter argument is that the Green Line Extension, as such a long, protracted
project, has allowed the trust to fail over time. The anecdotes that begin this thesis support that
argument - time on this project has only served to widen the gaps in trust between planners and
the public.
The best remedy to that will be to use the point of 'renewed commitment' discussed just
above, and make it clear to the public and planners alike that going forward, the Green Line
107
Extension is a new project, with new directions, and a new level of trust. That will be a most
difficult sell for those running the process, but it is worth a try. Acknowledging the fact that up to
now, the project has lost the trust of those it needs is one step that may help to repair it. Right
now, residents and staff of Somerville feel that infrastructure projects with benefit for the Greater
Boston area, but not specifically for Somerville, have been forced upon them for centuries. The
Green Line Extension is undoubtedly a more beneficial project for the immediate area than a
project like 1-93 or the Boston Engine Terminal. But the suspicion continues to linger that
somehow, someway, the city and residents of the area will be taken advantage of. This could
come in the form of unfulfilled promises on mitigation, rapid gentrification of areas or many
other potential comers could be cut, and promises broken.
Still, unlike some of the more concrete issues, there remains no perfect repair for trust.
The game for solving these issues has only just begun. Somerville must continue to work in good
faith with the state, and focus on making sure that these deceptions do not come to pass. Certain
types of commitment and clarity, such as a specific policy goal, can still make a difference in
these situations. The planners must make the more concrete improvements to the process in order
to signal to the public that they are serious about regaining trust and moving forward on this
project with new conviction. From there, hopefully planners can turn the tide, and bring trust
back over time.
Finally, it is vital to remember that this entire thesis is an academic exercise, and as such
has lessons buried within itself about the research process. Many of those lessons revolve around
the methodology chosen for undertaking the research. One major constraint of this thesis is the
choice to focus on a project that was not yet completed. The Green Line Extension was chosen
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for evaluation partially due to its familiarity, but also because of the potential for providing help
to a process that is besieged. The downside to that being that hindsight-focused evaluation of the
process simply does not exist. By choosing a project that was already completed, the scholar
would have an opportunity to see what physical, political and procedural impacts a process has.
There would be great value in understanding those, and answering the question as to whether
difficult processes really create strange outcomes - which is an assumption that this research has
made.8 Said assumption relies on personal experience and observation that strange processes are
difficult to navigate as a planner, but there is no evidence presented here that these process
difficulties are linked to difficult outcomes. If I were able to do this project over again, the most
interesting change to take would be to attempt to quantify what effects a similarly strange
process (such as the "Big Dig") had on the physical and political outcomes. We might be able to
look back and say that a clearer, better process may have avoided a certain difficult engineering
challenge, or political battle. Such an analysis could end up supporting this thesis, or rendering
much of the debate moot.
Similarly, a constraint of this thesis is to fail to properly quantify the form of 'better' we
would like to see in a project's process. Substituting 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' are fine for
the moment, but it would be important for future analysis to gain a more quantifiable
understanding of what 'better' really means. But creating that metric is potentially an entire
thesis in itself, which is why this thesis has sidestepped the issue. As pointed out as well, the
interview subjects had no incentive to tell the truth in the interviews. I feel very confident that
the interviewees did tell the truth the majority of the time, but if able to do this research again, I
would rethink the interview process. It would be more useful to have the interviews all be on the
8 Of course, a much more vigorous experimental design for this action would be necessary. It would be difficult to
determine how process affected outcome without a larger sample and balanced experimental research design.
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record. This would affirm that the interview subjects tell the truth, as their specific claims would
be published, but could also prevent them from being as open as possible. This tradeoff is one
that was understood at the beginning of this research, but if repeating the exercise it would be
more appropriate to change priorities. Such constraints are present in any research project, and it
is vital to identify them here in order to better prepare any future analysts undertaking similar
steps.
The failure of trust in planners threatens to continue to make it more and more difficult to
complete public works projects in Massachusetts. There are a variety of causes, symptoms and
repairs that we have discussed at length. But each person working for this project must look
within themselves and do the best they can individually to create a better process for everyone.
So what does this mean for the future of the Green Line Extension? The interviewees each had
their own opinions, ranging from never getting built to being done on time, but my personal
feelings were best summed up by Kate Fichter. She reminds us that when this gets done, "it is
going to be a really great thing." In principle, I certainly agree. The Green Line Extension is a
project with massive benefits for millions in Massachusetts. That isn't to say that there are not
some negative impacts for some sets of people. Arrow tells us that there is no process that can
perfectly solve the issues of social choice if there are significant disparate opinions, but the
planning on the Green Line Extension is working as hard as possible towards an great project for
everyone. There is no telling what twists and turns and agreement and dissent will occur on the
project in the next half decade, and whether the deadline will be made. What is certain is that the
Green Line Extension is a project worth building. And that infrastructure improvements in
Massachusetts, and beyond, are a process worth fixing.
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Ten years from now, there will be a meeting at Somerville High School's dark, dank
auditorium - most likely with some major event competing for people's attention. It could still
be on the Green Line Extension. Or it could be on a new project. People may drive their cars, or
they could walk from the Gilman Square Station on the Green Line. Whatever the case, Kate,
Ellin, Kristine, Regan and Ken are all likely to be there. Along with new and old voices, they are
all planners in one way or another, and their planning affects the lives of millions. I am certain
that the lessons they are learning now will guide them then. These lessons must be learned, and
planning reflected upon. Creating a better process for the Green Line Extension benefits all who
want to see the proposal become a reality. Using the lessons learned in this research, and
reflecting upon the process, will hopefully create a process that benefits all, and restores trust in
planners. The Green Line Extension has no easy and simple answers. Planners must work to find
the difficult solutions in order to restore that trust.
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Appendix A: Interview questions
Introduction
1. What is your full title and an example of your responsibilities?
2. Can you give me a brief overview of your (and your organization's) involvement with the
Green Line Extension project?
3. What do you see as your purpose to fill in the planning process for the GLE? Or the
person in your positions purpose?
History
4. Will you sum up for me how you look at the history of the Green Line Project - how far
back does it go? Where do you consider this project to have started?
5. How much do you feel that Boston's history with transportation projects (ie, the Big Dig)
has a role in the day to day decisions made on this project?
6. How have the current economic and energy crisis' had an impact on the status and
direction of the project?
Regulations
7. What laws and regulations do you see as having major impact on the current planning
process?
8. What laws and regulations would you like to see eliminated in order to aid in finding a
solution to some of the problems and impasses on the Green Line Extension?
9. In your position, what laws and regulations do you refer to on a daily basis in order to
work on the Green Line Extension?
a. Do you often consult the SIP and its amendments? The Beyond Lechmere study?
The DEP Certificate?
b. Which is most important in guiding you?
c. (Take the most important document) - How do you interpret this document? Do
you take all the parts literally, or do you rely on interpreting the words?
Maintenance Facility
10. What do you think about the current plans for the maintenance facility in the Inner Belt
area?
11. How would you describe the current status of the planning process - at an impasse, or
moving forward?
12. Do you feel that the planning for this maintenance facility has been constrained in any
way? By what or who?
a. Follow up: Do you feel that the impasse you have has been caused by the
personnel involved in the planning process, but the circumstances or is just a
difference of opinion?
13. What is your ideal solution to the maintenance facility issue?
a. Is there any way you can see under the current circumstances to get to that
solution?
b. How would you define the "best" outcome for the siting of the facility? What
considerations are most important to you?
14. At what point will you feel satisfied with a solution to the maintenance facility?
15. What do you think needs to change in order to get to that point?
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Synthesis
16. Do you feel that the history of the GLE has played a part in getting to this point of
impasse on the maintenance facility?
17. From the guiding documents and the history that you know, how has the purpose of the
Green Line Extension changed? Is it still all about air quality and EPA attainment? Do
you see it as a political concession? Is transit justice the primary driver?
18. Do you feel that a project with this (from above) purpose is the right way for the state or
the MBTA to do planning?
19. Are there too many cooks in the kitchen when it comes to this project? Or are we not
hearing enough opinions?
20. If you could go back in time to a point in this project's history and make a change of
course, how far back would you go, and what would you change?
21. What do you think will be the end result of this planning process?
a. A completed GLE with maintenance facilty?
b. A completed GLE with no facility?
c. A SIP revision?
d. Nothing, for the foreseeable future?
22. Can you think of a similar process or problem that was mired in a similar situation that
you were involved in? If so, how was that solved?
23. Who are some other people I should speak to about this project?
114
Appendix B: List of Interviews
Arranged Alphabetically
Pete Butler
Federal Transportation Authority, Region 1
February 18, 2009
Regan Checcio
Public Affairs Manager, Regina Villa Associates
Public Affairs Manager, Green Line Extension consultant team
February 6, 2009
Noah Chesnin
Program Assistant, Conservation Law Foundation
Member, Green Line Extension Advisory Committee
January 30, 2009
Rita Donnelly
Abutter
Member, Green Line Extension Advisory Committee
February 16, 2009
Kate Fichter
Transportation Planner, Executive Office of Transportation
Deputy Project Manager, Green Line Extension
February 10, 2009
Ken Krause
President, Medford Green Line Neighborhood Alliance
Member, Green Line Extension Advisory Committee
February 12, 2009
Monica Lamboy
Executive Director, City of Somerville Office of Strategic Planning and Community
Development
Member, Green Line Extension Advisory Committee
February 13, 2009
Jon Linecheck
District Director, Office of Congressman Mike Capuano
February 26, 2009
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Sergiu Luchian
Director of Transportation and Infrastructure, City of Somerville Office of Strategic Planning
and Community Development (former)
February 13, 2009
Rob May
Director of Economic Development, City of Somerville Office of Strategic Planning and
Community Development
February 13, 2009
Ellin Reisner
President, Somerville Transportation Equity Partnership
Member, Green Line Extension Advisory Committee
January 29, 2009
Kristine Wickham
Vanasse Hangen Brustlin
Deputy Project Manager, Green Line Extension consultant team
February 2, 2009
Steve Woelfel
Manager of Statewide Transportation Planning, Executive Office of Transportation
Project Manager, Green Line Extension
February 27, 2009
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